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Decommunization by Design: Analyzing the post-independence transformation of Soviet-era architectural urbanism in Kyiv, Ukraine

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Abstract

This study investigates the spatial effects of the ongoing “decommunization” campaign in Ukraine, a state-led attack on Soviet symbols and ideology in the urban space of the capital, Kyiv. We examine decommunization through the lens of an extensive legacy of architectural, urban design, and monumental art projects erected for the celebration of the 1500th anniversary of the city of Kyiv held in 1982. We focus on four ideological narratives and examine the outcomes of decommunization on four monuments. We find that decommunization’s effect is limited; Communist symbolism has been annotated with Ukrainian identity symbols or neglected, not demolished. We conclude that decommunization has focused on the comparatively superficial qualities of toponomy and Lenin symbols, that the legacy of Soviet identity in Kyiv’s cityscape is much deeper and has proved surprisingly persistent, and that the historiography of the newly independent nation of Ukraine is still in a process of reformation and revision.

Keywords: decommunization, urban design politics, national identity, monumental propaganda, Ukraine, postcolonialism.

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Introduction

This study explores recent transformations in Kyiv, Ukraine's "architectural urbanism"¹, particularly that created as part of the city's Soviet-inspired "1500th anniversary" of 1982. We examine transformations that have occurred specifically in response to the so-called "decommunization campaign" following the 2014 Euromaidan protests, also referred to as the Maidan and "The Revolution of Dignity", as well as those transformations that have occurred since Ukrainian independence in 1991. The post-2014 campaign aimed to establish an autonomous identity for the young nation-state of Ukraine through the stated goal of de-ideologizing urban space, a goal that was constituted of the renaming of toponyms (place names), as well as of removals, transformations, and additions to the capital's architectural urbanism² as well as monumental public art. Decommunization was explicitly intended to address the Soviet-era heritage of Ukraine's built environment, hence its name.

The contemporary risk of demolition of Soviet heritage in Ukraine has led to the emergence of activist communities advocating this heritage's preservation. Such efforts are often led by architects, urban designers, and artists who advocate the value of Soviet-era modernist heritage³ or who protest the removal of Soviet artworks from public museums⁴. Some decommunization – either renaming or removal – has met with similar organized civic action that utilized social media, petitions, and street actions to oppose local council decisions or to advocate instead for alternative renaming options⁵.

¹Melanie Dodd, S. Helsel, and A. Johnson, *Architectural Urbanism: Melbourne / Seoul* (Seoul: Exhibition at K-ARTS Gallery, 2013).

² Dodd et al., *Architectural Urbanism*.

³ See Ukrainian Modernism, Facebook. November 3, 2015, <https://www.facebook.com/ukrmod/>, for the example of cataloging valuable Soviet architectural urbanism and highlighting the cases of its removal or demolition; Savekyivmodernism, Facebook. November 25, 2017, <https://savekyivmodernism.com>, on the case of architect-led protest against redevelopment of the modernist building of the Institute of scientific information and expertise into a shopping mall.

⁴ Alex Fisher, "The Kmytiv Museum of Soviet Art," *This Is Badland*, n.d., <https://thisisbadland.com/the-kmytiv-museum-of-soviet-art/>.

⁵ For example, see Bul'var Vatslava Havela (Ukr. – Vaclav Havel Boulevard), Facebook, September 23, 2015, <https://www.facebook.com/havelkyiv/>.

A number of studies and publications are devoted to assessing the spatial effects of decommunization, particularly toponymic renaming⁶, or to cataloging of Soviet heritage, either that already demolished or that heritage at risk of demolition or stigmatization⁷. However, despite the presence of decommunization studies in the scholarly literature and of activism in practice, there are at present few studies examining a coherent body of Soviet ideological work undertaken through architecture, urbanism, and public space in Ukrainian cities. Nor have there been studies of such work's transformation in the post-independence or decommunization era. This study was motivated by the belief that such an analysis would permit built environment scholars to understand how, and why, elements of the Soviet ideological spectrum have become targets of Ukraine's decommunization, and conversely, how and why other elements of this spectrum have remained unseen or that have been left unchanged, or normalized. It is this lacuna in the built environment and urban heritage literature that this study hopes to address.

As mentioned in Forest and Johnson's study of post-Soviet national identity in Moscow⁸, national capitals tend to both accumulate the prominent elite's conception of the nation and to become vulnerable to transformation at historical turning points which Forest and Johnson call "critical junctures"⁹. By focusing on such transformation in the capital city of Kyiv and utilizing the 2014 Euromaidan as a critical juncture, this study both documents the progress of decommunization in Kyiv and explores its limits, with

⁶ See Oleksiy Gnatiuk, "The renaming of streets in post-revolutionary Ukraine: Regional strategies to construct a new national identity," *Acta Universitatis Carolinae Geographica*, no. 53 (2018): 1-18, on the analysis of toponymic renaming patterns in Ukraine; Artemy Plekhanov, "Razrusheniye prostranstva sovetskogo simvolicheskogo gosudarstva v postsovetskoi' Ukrain'e" (Rus. – Demolition of the ruling symbolic Soviet space in post-Soviet Ukraine), *Politicheskaya nauka*, no. 3 (2018): 190-216, on the analysis of decommunization timeline.

⁷ See Niels Ackermann and Sebastian Gobert, *Looking for Lenin* (London: FUEL Publishing, 2017), on tracing the removed Lenin monuments; Yevgen Nikiforov and Olga Balashova, *Decommunized: Ukrainian Soviet Mosaics* (DOM Publishers, 2017), on decommunization of Soviet mosaics; Oleksii Bykov and Ievgeniia Gubkina, *Soviet Modernism, Brutalism, Post-Modernism: Buildings and Projects in Ukraine 1960-1990* (Osnovy Publishing & DOM Publishers, 2019), on cataloging of Soviet architectural urbanism in Ukraine by styles.

⁸ Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson, "Unraveling the Threads of History: Soviet-Era Monuments and Post-Soviet National Identity in Moscow," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 92, no. 3 (2002): 524-547.

⁹ Forest and Johnson, "Unraveling the Threads," 525.

the goal of refining the conceptual framework for what decommunization can accomplish in the built environment.

To study Kyiv's decommunization, we first review Soviet built environment ideology, and apply a post-colonial reading of the USSR's nationality policy, before examining the history of the 1982 Soviet celebration of Kyiv's 1500th anniversary. The latter celebration represents an example of a "spectacular" memorial event, which, as described in Mitchell¹⁰, aims to produce a certain collective memory at the city scale, combining "fixed" monumental elements with "mobile" ritual events. While Soviet themes and historical contributions to Kyiv's architectural urbanism definitely pre-date 1982, including the city's post-WW2 Stalinist reconstruction, the 1982 celebration stands as a kind of fulcrum, in terms of quantity and sheer rhetoric, from which to examine Soviet production of designed space in Kyiv. This ideologically freighted event generated over one hundred works of architecture, urbanism, and monumental art, each of which embodied a complex ideological message of *Soviet* Ukrainian identity. We also note that there were a variety of post-independence decommunization turning points including the 2004 Orange Revolution, but that only the 2014 Revolution of Dignity finally spurred large-scale decommunization in Ukraine.

In this study, we provide an overview of the Kyiv-1500 legacy in the city's built environment. We reveal and classify ideological meanings embodied in this legacy, focusing on several architectural and monumental artifacts that vividly represent Soviet conceptions of Ukrainian identity. Finally, we reflect upon the transformation of that identity, based on the treatment of those artifacts under decommunization, and assess the various design strategies that have been applied to them. We conclude with a refined and revised understanding and definition of the potential for decommunization, and related movements, to transform the built environment of arguably postcolonial or posthegemonic cities and states, a revision that is especially meaningful in light of the current reexamination of built environments in the United States, among other nations, with respect to their treatment of slavery and indigenous people genocide.

¹⁰ Katharyne Mitchell, "Monuments, Memorials, and the Politics of Memory," *Urban Geography* 24, no. 5 (2003): 442-459.

Context

Decommunization: a revolutionary movement, a package of laws

The Euromaidan began on November 21, 2013, after hundreds of protesters occupied the Independence square (Maidan Nezhalozhnosti¹¹ in Ukrainian) at the center of Kyiv. Protesters opposed the then-government's refusal to sign an association agreement between Ukraine and the European Union. By refusing, the then-government yielded to political pressure from Russia and the threat of an embargo on Ukrainian export goods¹².

Following government violence against the protesters, the Euromaidan movement quickly transformed into the largest public protest in Kyiv since 2004's "Orange Revolution." Over 800,000 people participated in a rally on December 8, 2013¹³. One outcome of this night was the protesters' demolition of a monument to Vladimir Lenin on nearby Shevchenko boulevard, presumably by far-right activists representing one political wing of the Euromaidan movement. The monument's demolition caused a mixed reaction within the Euromaidan movement and elsewhere¹⁴

In early 2014 protests continued to grow in Ukraine, resulting in temporary occupation of public buildings in central Kyiv¹⁵ and several other cities¹⁶. The Lenin monument demolition campaign

¹¹ The word "Maidan" is directly translated from Ukrainian as a "square", at the same time in many instances referring to the particular site – Independence square in Kyiv.

¹² Roman Olearchyk, "Russia accused of triggering trade war with Ukraine," *Financial Times*, August 15, 2013, <https://www.ft.com/content/99068c0e-0595-11e3-8ed5-00144feab7de>.

¹³ Serhii Plokhii, "Goodbye Lenin: A Memory Shift in Revolutionary Ukraine," *MAPA – Digital Atlas of Ukraine*, 2018, <https://gis.huri.harvard.edu/images/leninfall/LeninfallPaper.pdf>.

¹⁴ Plokhii, "Goodbye Lenin."

¹⁵ Adam Taylor, "These maps show the chaotic history of Kiev's protests," *Washington Post*, February 21, 2014, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/02/21/these-maps-show-the-chaotic-history-of-kievs-protests/>.

¹⁶ Paul Waldie, "In the hinterland, Ukraine's revolution gains traction," *The Globe and Mail*, January 27, 2014, <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/in-the-hinterland-ukraines-revolution-gains-traction/article16538334/>.

continued in tandem with the protests. 550 Lenin monuments were removed within one month either directly by the protesters or by cooperative local governments during what came to be called “Leninfall”, or *Leninopad* in Ukrainian¹⁷. Lenin demolitions continued in a piecemeal fashion after pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich was ousted in February 2014 and Russia forcibly annexed Crimea in March of the same year. Leninopad was the first manifestation of what would become a full-scale decommunization campaign. It would lead to the mass removal of explicitly Communist Soviet symbols from the built environment of Ukraine.

However, the decommunization phenomenon observed in Ukraine after 2014 was not the first such movement, nor was it unique to Ukraine. Decommunization has previously occurred in other post-socialist states, including Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechia, and the Baltic republics – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania – where a number of Soviet monuments were eliminated between 1989 and the early 1990s, as the Soviet Union dissolved abruptly¹⁸. This ‘first decommunization’ of the early 1990s was not just spatial, but political and legal: Pomorski discusses the notion of “decommunization by legal means”¹⁹, or abolishing the political autonomy of the communist party. Political decommunization, in other words, constituted a transition from central planning to the market economy, and a rejection of Marxism-Leninism as the state ideology.

Examples of first decommunization legal acts were the 1991 law “On the rehabilitation of the victims of political repressions in Ukraine”²⁰. The newly independent country’s first wave of spatial decommunization included the 1989-1993 campaign of restoring pre-Soviet historical names of Ukrainian

¹⁷ Plokhii, “Goodbye Lenin”.

¹⁸ Mariusz Czepeczyński, "Interpreting post-socialist icons: from pride and hate towards disappearance and/or assimilation," *Journal of Studies and Research in Human Geography* 4, no. 1 (2010): 67-78.

¹⁹ Stanisław Pomorski, "Meanings of Decommunization by Legal Means," *Review of Central and East European Law* 22, no. 3 (1996): 331-338.

²⁰ Valerii Kononenko, "Dekomunizatsiia iak pravova chy politychna otsinka naslidkiv komunistychnoho rezhymu: ukraïns'kyï dosvid v zahal'noievropeï's'komu konteksti" (Ukr. – Decommunization as a legal or political assessment of the consequences of the communist regime: the Ukrainian experience), *Journal of Eastern European Law*, no. 61 (2019): 13-21.

cities, such as *Mariupol, Luhansk, and Alchevsk, from Zhdanov, Voroshylovgrad, and Komunarsk*²¹. As part of this first decommunization, municipalities in Western and Central Ukraine initiated the demolition of some Soviet-period monuments and the renaming of streets and public buildings²². The transformations were sometimes symbolic in what was added, as well as what was removed. In 1991 Kyiv's October Revolution monument, located squarely in the center of the Maidan in front of the "Moskva" (Moscow) hotel (later to be renamed "Ukraina" (Ukraine) in 2001 for the tenth anniversary of Ukraine's independence), was dismantled and replaced by a glassy underground shopping mall. The symbolism, even if unintentional, was clear. But only Western Ukraine experienced mass decommunization at the first era: most Ukrainian cities retained their Lenin statues and other Soviet-era artifacts.

During the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010), a 'second decommunization' was in part motivated by the growing desire to commemorate the victims of 1932-33 Holodomor, the name given to a series of famines and political repressions, particularly in rural Ukraine, that occurred at Stalin's behest²³. During this period decommunization efforts led to the dismantlement of 400 monuments, and to the changing of 3000 toponyms in 2007-08²⁴. These renamings aimed to erase a public memory of high Soviet officials deemed to be responsible for the Holodomor.

The latest, or third, wave of decommunization, and the subject of this study, began during the 2014 Euromaidan and was codified by a new legal framework that emerged in the presidency of Petro Poroshenko (2014-2019). Poroshenko engaged in many nation-building efforts apart from decommunization, including attempting to restore the capacity of Ukraine's armed forces amidst conflict with Russian-led separatists, building support for Ukrainian language and culture, and ensuring

²¹ Plekhanov, "Demolition of the ruling," 192.

²² Ibid., 192.

²³ See Anne Applebaum, *Red Famine: Stalin's War on Ukraine* (Signal, 2017), on the history of Holodomor famine.

²⁴ Plekhanov, "Demolition of the ruling," 193.

recognition of an independent Ukrainian Orthodox church²⁵. Among these nation-building efforts was the reinstatement of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINP) as an executive body in charge of restoring and preserving the “national memory”²⁶. Historian and activist Volodymyr Viatrovykh directed UINP during 2014-2019, becoming a chief ideologist and promoter of decommunization.

Viatrovykh’s efforts focused on swift preparation of a so-called “decommunization laws package”. This was rapidly adopted in April 2015 by Ukraine’s parliament. The “package” consisted of four laws: “The Law on the legal status and commemoration of the memory of Ukraine’s independence movement in the XX century”; “The Law on the access to archives of repressive organs of the Communist totalitarian regime of 1917-1991”; “The Law on the perpetuation of the victory over Nazism in the World War II of 1939-1945”; and “The Law on conviction of communist and national-socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and prohibition of the propaganda of their symbols”.

The last law provided a procedural backbone for built-environment decommunization as well as toponymic decommunization. Since 2014 this article has resulted in the mass renaming of Ukraine’s cities, streets, and institutions; in the demolition and removal of Soviet-era art and decorations from public spaces, and in the organization of numerous exhibitions on the history of Ukraine’s independence movement. As part of its conceptual rationale, the fourth law drew specific parallels between the Communist and Nazi regimes²⁷, thereby explicitly grouping Communism with a thoroughly discredited ideology whose symbols have become anathema and which are illegal in their country of origin (Germany). The law additionally prohibited the Communist Party in Ukraine, a measure that had failed in 1991²⁸, while also introducing criminal conviction for “Soviet symbols propaganda”, another measure similar to Germany’s treatment of Nazism today.

²⁵ Volodymyr Yermolenko, "Does Poroshenko Have a Chance at a Second Term?," *Atlantic Council*, October 1, 2018, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/does-poroshenko-have-a-shot-at-a-second-term/>.

²⁶ Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, *Decree #292 On the issue of the Ukrainian Institute for National Remembrance* Government Portal, accessed January 11, 2021, <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/npas/247492837>.

²⁷ Kononenko, “Decommunization as a legal,” 17.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 16.

More specifically, Article 4 of the fourth law defined “propaganda” as a public display of state symbols of the USSR and republics within the socialist bloc, including flags, anthems, coats of arms (particularly the five-pointed red star and hammer and sickle), slogans, and names of Soviet institutions. The law banished monumental depictions of Soviet leaders and officials, most obviously but not exclusively Lenin, and proclaimed a renaming of Soviet toponyms referencing now-forbidden names, institutions, and ideologies. These measures, too, resembled those instituted to prohibit the presence in the German built environment of symbols of the Nazi regime.

Despite the law’s centralized attack on Soviet symbols, the implementation of decommunization activities was left to local Ukrainian governments (e.g., street renaming) or to the national parliament (e.g., city renaming). The Institute of National Remembrance (UINP) performed executive and supervisory functions of decommunization, compiling lists of what they deemed to be communist toponyms and monuments, reviewing petitions, providing consultations and, in some cases, pressing local authorities to proceed with decommunization agendas. Built environment decommunization proceeded apace. By October 2017 all of the approximately 5,500 Lenin monuments in Ukraine had been removed²⁹, while UINP Director Viatrovych reported around 1000 toponymic changes to settlements during that same year³⁰.

In 2019 Viatrovych described UINP’s decommunization achievements as having provided open access to KGB archives, removed totalitarian symbols (e.g., Lenin statues) from public space, rehabilitated victims of repressions, and as having promoted “popularization of Ukrainian history”³¹. In an earlier statement, Viatrovych had claimed that the decommunization of 2014-16 had achieved far beyond

²⁹ Plokhii, “Goodbye Lenin”.

³⁰ Volodymyr Viatrovych, “Decomunizatsiia – vazhlyvyi process, ne lyshe rezul’tat – interv’iu z Volodymyrom Viatrovychem” (Ukr. – Decommunization – the process is also important, not just the result), interview by Myroslav Borysenko and Tetiana Vodotyka. *Misto: Istoriiya, Kultura, Suspil’stvo (MIKS)*, no. 1 (2017): 101-111.

³¹ Volodymyr Viatrovych, “Ya zavershyv kadentsiyu na posadi holovy Institutu Natsional'noi Pam'yati” (Ukr. – I completed my term as a Director of Institute of National Remembrance), Facebook, September 18, 2019, <https://www.facebook.com/volodymyr.viatrovych/videos/10215092657089309/>.

its legal mandate: “The process of decommunization is something far more than those four laws.

Decommunization, in brief, is an attempt to overcome the communist, totalitarian heritage, [to] eliminate it from history, [and to] make sure it does not recreate itself to influence the present, in the broadest meaning of the word”³².

In sum, decommunization can be understood as an ideological movement with revolutionary implications, a dramatic counterreaction to decades of Communist ideology. It was also more bureaucratically a packet of legal measures, while culturally, decommunization legislated historical revisionism and attempted to reclaim, or reshape, a version of early-21C Ukrainian collective memory. Whereas popular demonstrations did remove some Lenin statues in the early part of decommunization’s third wave, the majority were removed by legal fiat, a bureaucratic requirement that in some ways mirrored the very bureaucracy that had erected these Communist symbols and expunged the earlier Czarist historical record in the first place.

But what of the other “totalitarian” symbols in Ukraine’s cities and built environment? What of the Socialist emblems decorating building facades, metro stations, and public spaces? What of the buildings themselves, such as the numerous Lenin Museums, the Communist Party headquarters, the Komsomol (Young Communist) centers and camps? What of the myriads of other explicitly Soviet, Socialist, or Communist constructions in Ukrainian cities, deeply embedded within those parts of the urban fabric constructed under Communism? Before addressing these questions, we will define the scope of potential targets of decommunization in the built environment and assess the design policies that created them during the Soviet era.

Concepts and Literatures

Urban Design Politics of the Soviet City

Ideology and political propaganda were an essential feature of Soviet-controlled cities from the regime’s inception in the October Revolution of 1917, the Bolshevik-led episode of the Russian

³² Viatrovyeh, interview, 101.

Revolution that assumed canonical importance under the Soviet regime. In order to assess the connection between built form and political purposes, we utilize the concept of “urban design politics”³³. In our analysis of Soviet urban design politics, we will distinguish between “monumental propaganda”, a term that covers specific activities aimed to establish the presence of Soviet state ideology in public space, and the notion of the “Soviet” or “socialist city”, a term that reflects ideological motives in city planning and urban infrastructure development under the Soviet regime.

The first Soviet monumental propaganda emerged in 1918 when the Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR³⁴ issued a Decree, “On the Republic’s monuments”. The initiative for the Decree and the first Plan for Monumental Propaganda is believed to have come from Lenin himself³⁵. Lenin possibly took inspiration for his decree from Tommaso Campanella’s utopian “City of the Sun” where city walls were supposed to be covered with frescos in order to “stimulate patriotic feelings” in the youth³⁶.

Czarist-era monuments were initial targets of the monumental propaganda campaign. They were replaced with Bolshevik-approved ones. The campaign’s proclaimed goal was “propaganda of the new world”³⁷. However, after 1924, and accelerating in the 1930s, Soviet monumental propaganda was transformed into a toponymic and monumental cult surrounding the figure of Stalin in the company of deceased, quasi-canonized Bolshevik leaders Lenin, Kirov, and a few others³⁸. Monumental propaganda

³³ See Lawrence Vale, *Architecture, Power and National Identity* (London, New York: Routledge, 2008), for detailed investigation of the concept of urban design politics.

³⁴ The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic was proclaimed in 1917 and entered the Soviet Union when the latter was formed in 1922.

³⁵ Christina Lodder, "Lenin’s plan for monumental propaganda," in *Art of the soviets: Painting, sculpture and architecture in a one-party state*, eds. Brandon Taylor and Matthew Bown (Manchester University Press, 1993), 16-32.

³⁶ Nadezhda Shalaeva, "Stanovleniye plana monumental’noi propagandy v sovetskoi’ Rossii” (Rus. – Formation of the Monumental Propaganda Plan in Soviet Russia), *Vestnik Chelyabinskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta*, no. 8 (2014): 18-24.

³⁷ Shalaeva, “Formation,” 22.

³⁸ Kirill Demyanov and Valentina Ryzhenko, "Ideologiya, toponimika, politika pam’yati: o massovom pereimenovanii gorodov v SSSR” (Rus. – Ideology, Toponymics, Memory Politics: On Mass Renaming of Cities in USSR), *Vestnik Omskogo Universiteta*, no. 4 (2017): 153-160.

during this era took the form of megaprojects, particularly in or around Moscow, such as the unfinished Palace of the Soviets³⁹ and the completed Moscow-Volga Canal, with associated statuary and architecture⁴⁰. Documents such as the 1935 Moscow General Plan was also part of the monumental propaganda movement⁴¹.

Under Stalin, monumental propaganda shifted from a future-oriented ideology toward one focused on past and current achievements. Vale⁴² notes that political regimes often combine forward-reaching messages with links to the past, glorifying a particular historical period, in order to legitimize their claim to rule. In Vale's reading, the placement of Lenin's tomb adjacent to the traditional and ancient power ensemble of the Kremlin fortress in Moscow is an example of such manipulation. The symbolism and rituals associated with Lenin's tomb make it a "mediated monument", one that is characterized by its inseparability from media campaigns around it⁴³.

Vladimir Paperny⁴⁴ explained this Stalinist shift from future to present-past by the existence of two intertwined "cultures" that existed throughout Soviet history – a future-oriented, egalitarian and essentially modernist Culture 1, and a legacy-oriented, hierarchical and chauvinist Culture 2. According to this understanding, "Culture 1" manifested itself in the Soviet avant-garde architecture and art of 1920s and again in the 1950s-60s mass housing projects under Khrushchev, while the aforementioned example of Lenin's mausoleum on the Red Square in Moscow illustrates a devotion to hierarchy and to glorification of past and present achievements under "Culture 2". Paperny saw rapid "culture" shifts

³⁹ Vladimir Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin – Culture Two* (Cambridge University Press, 2002): 235.

⁴⁰ Cynthia Ruder, *Building Stalinism: The Moscow Canal and the Creation of Soviet Space* (London - New York: I.B. Tauris & Co, 2018).

⁴¹ Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*.

⁴² Lawrence Vale, "Mediated monuments and national identity," *The Journal of Architecture*, no. 4 (1999): 391-408.

⁴³ Vale, "Mediated monuments," 391.

⁴⁴ Paperny, *Architecture in the Age of Stalin*.

emerging from time to time, a phenomenon that registered in architectural shifts that Hatherley called “sudden zigzags of official style”⁴⁵.

Soviet-era architectural heritage, therefore, took the form of a heterogeneous grouping of styles, ranging from constructivist modernism to classicism, to modernism again, prior to its end of production in 1991. In monumental art, the same eclectic mix led first to Constructivist art, then to the emergence of the Socialist Realist style in the 1930s, a hybrid of “restrained modernism” and modified classicism, as Lodder put it⁴⁶, that would endure until the 1950s.

While the products of monumental propaganda – sculptures and signature buildings – occupied a central place in Soviet public space, the urban background, routine in other political settings in other countries, also carried ideological significance. This gave life to the concept of the Soviet, or socialist city. According to Zarecor⁴⁷, socialist cities were spatial and cultural manifestations of state power, a power that had complete legal and spatial control over design, construction and extension, as well as over land use⁴⁸. The Soviet state created an integrated network of urban systems, including utilities, infrastructure, public transport, cultural and educational institutions, green spaces, and housing developments, all of which Zarecor called a “socialist scaffold”⁴⁹.

Hatherley⁵⁰ defines several distinct urban design typologies that represent typical examples of the socialist scaffold and that can be immediately recognized as “Soviet”. Those include *magistrales*, ceremonial boulevards used for parades; *microrayons*, monofunctional housing estates comprised of prefabricated apartment housing; *vysocki*, privileged high rise housing for the chosen; social condensers,

⁴⁵ Owen Hatherley, *Landscapes of Communism – A History Through Buildings* (New York: The New Press, 2016), 30.

⁴⁶ Lodder, “Lenin’s plan,” 16-17.

⁴⁷ Kimberly Zarecor, “What was so socialist about the socialist city? Second World Urbanity in Europe,” *Journal of Urban History* 44, no. 1 (2018): 95-117.

⁴⁸ Sonia Hirt, Slavomíra Ferenčuhová, and Tauri Tuvikene, “Conceptual forum: the “post-socialist” city,” *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 57, (2016): 497-520.

⁴⁹ Zarecor, “What was so socialist,” 99.

⁵⁰ Hatherley, *Landscapes of Communism*, 31.

such as workers clubs and palaces of culture; urban rapid transit, especially metro lines; the ‘historical’ reconstruction of cities destroyed in WWII; and memorials, most of which are attributed to WWII, “The Great Patriotic War” in Soviet parlance⁵¹.

Redacted noted that a lack of “plural” or private properties in Soviet cities made urban design in the Communist sphere both ideologically and functionally straightforward, with slogans and state symbols occupying central positions in urban space that was also itself a state symbol. This raises the question of *scale* in the enterprise of decommunization, since not only statues, but streets, districts, cities, and even regional development served as ideological statements in Soviet times. Erasing Soviet symbols under such circumstances would involve a profound confrontation of the varying scales and forms of the “Soviet city”, instead of the narrowly focused particular semiotic and linguistic forms outlined in the 2014 decommunization laws.

While urban systems and spatial hierarchies embedded with socialist meaning outlived the socialist political regime⁵², the ideological significance of these systems was not always perceived in the same way throughout the Soviet period. Anthropologist Alexey Yurchak⁵³ suggested that ideological representations, from speeches to posters and monuments, experienced a “performative shift” in the post-Stalin USSR, resulting in their referential meaning becoming less important. Yurchak’s examples include the recycling of official speeches, the predictable location and content of ideological posters, and canonical, even hackneyed, depictions of Lenin in art. Humpfrey⁵⁴ confirmed that the ideological role of urban infrastructure in the late Soviet period was taken for granted by the general public and that its

⁵¹ Hatherley also comes up with another typology, which is rather post-Soviet – “improvisation”, or informal, often DIY “improvements” initiated by residents of the multi-dwelling housing (e.g., extended balconies) or small business (e.g., illegal kiosks).

⁵² Zarecor, “What was so socialist,” 96.

⁵³ Alexey Yurchak, *Everything was forever, until it was no more: The last Soviet generation* (Princeton University Press, 2006), 14.

⁵⁴ Caroline Humpfrey, "Ideology in infrastructure: architecture and Soviet imagination," *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, no. 11 (2005): 39-58.

“Sovietness” thus was unconscious, while an ongoing ideological control of architecture was unspoken and hidden even from architects themselves.

Thus, communist ideology in the Soviet built environment was multiscalar, ubiquitous and stylistically heterogeneous. This presents an interesting potential dilemma for decommunization, since communist artifacts are both widespread, making their total removal likely impossible, and arguably meaningless through ubiquity, thus making their total removal probably unnecessary. In Ukraine, however, Communist ideology also had an additional purpose: to define, create, and simultaneously subvert “Ukrainian identity”. Kyiv’s late Soviet architectural urbanism was suffused with this identity, thereby making the city not just a Soviet city, but a *Soviet-Ukrainian* city. Any understanding of decommunization as a political process of built environment alteration needs also review the treatment and perception of Ukrainian identity, together with the Ukrainian ‘national movement’ under the USSR. This history is reviewed briefly below.

A Post-Colonial, Post-Soviet Ukrainian City?

Everything is called Ukraine –
a department store, a restaurant, a factory.
“Ukrainian” bread,
so is the television.
On the vodka label
Is Hetman⁵⁵ with a mace.
And only language is a foreigner in her own house –
the claws of chauvinism appear subconscious.
(excerpt from “*The Star Integral*” poem by Lina Kostenko, 1963. Translation by authors)

Ukraine has arguably been under colonial control for centuries. Beginning in the 18C, cities with ethnic Ukrainian inhabitants could be found in either the Russian or the Austrian empires. However, ethnic Ukrainians were predominantly rural, while city dwellers in Ukraine or “Little Russia”, as the part of Ukraine under Russian control was called at the time, were ethnically diverse, of Polish, Jewish, Lithuanian, or Russian origins. This diversity made cities distinct islands “in the sea of Ukrainian peasantry”⁵⁶. Ukraine’s southern and eastern regions were sites for ethnic Russian colonization through

⁵⁵ Hetman is a warlord and political leader in the Ukrainian Cossack state (XVI-XVIII cent.).

⁵⁶ Applebaum, *Red Famine*, 6.

the foundation of new towns and the development of coal mining in the Donbas region⁵⁷. This linguistic pluralism of Ukraine, with Russian-speakers concentrated in cities and in areas of historic Russian colonization, has persisted to the present day, despite the devastating Holodomor famine, Stalinist deportations, WW2, and Holocaust, events that killed up to 25% of Ukraine's population during less than two decades between 1930 and 1950⁵⁸.

Can Ukraine be understood as a colonized territory, and today as a post-colonial country? In his article "The Post-Colonial Is Not Enough"⁵⁹ Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak points out Ukraine's anomalous position in the Russian empire and then the Soviet Union. Hrytsak describes Ukraine as both a center of resistance to the Soviet "project", and as a core of that same project, a condition that he describes somewhat idiosyncratically as "modernization with internal colonization". Meanwhile, historian Taras Kuzjo⁶⁰ found that Ukraine's post-colonial status was complicated. Since the language of modernization and industrialization in Ukraine under the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union had been Russian, this suggests that the 'post-colonial Russian' legacy in Ukraine will be difficult to remove completely.

Terry Martin, writing on the concept of ethnicity in the USSR, describes this nation as the "world's first Affirmative Action Empire"⁶¹. While preserving the territorial integrity of the Russian Empire, the Bolshevik regime attempted to escape becoming a new empire itself. Adopting the slogan of nations' right to self-determination, Bolsheviks granted narrowly defined "forms" of nationhood to national "republics", including national territories, national languages, national elites, national cultures, and even individual membership for Ukraine in international organizations such as the United Nations⁶².

⁵⁷ Ibid., 9.

⁵⁸ Orest Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History. Fourth Edition* (University of Toronto Press, 2009), 529.

⁵⁹ Yaroslav Hrytsak, "The postcolonial is not enough," *Slavic Review* 74, no. 4 (2015): 732-737.

⁶⁰ Taras Kuzjo, "History, Memory and Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Colonial Space," *Nationalities Papers* 30, no. 2 (2002): 241-264.

⁶¹ Terry Martin, *The affirmative action empire: Nations and nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939*, (Cornell University Press, 2001).

⁶² Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire*.

As a grouping of allegedly emancipated and freely associated “republics”, the Soviet Union was also a fierce advocate for decolonization in the so-called “Third World” in the 1950s and afterward.

One affirmative action strategy in Ukraine emerged in the 1920s through the “indigenization” policy, also referred to as “Ukrainization”. Applebaum found that “in 1923 just over half of schools in the republic taught children in Ukrainian. A decade later the figure ha[d] risen to 88 percent”⁶³. Martin discussed “hard” and “soft” lines on nationalism⁶⁴ in Bolshevik institutions. The former maintained core Bolshevik policies and values while the latter “corrected excesses” by granting narrow opportunities for public participation. Soft-line Soviet “indigenization” policy supported national schools, museums, and folk music ensembles, while hard-line policy simultaneously prosecuted “undesired separatist nationalism”. Only some Ukrainian nationalism, in other words, was permissible. Under Stalin, hard-line dominance led to the “Great Retreat of 1933-38”⁶⁵ and to the gradual rehabilitation of Russian cultural dominance under the aegis of the “Friendship of the Soviet Peoples” concept.

Tlostanova⁶⁶ found that post-war racial discourse in the Soviet Union had been supplanted by class or ideology, yet that such discourse was still present in the form of a hierarchy of “brother” socialist states. In the 1965 pamphlet “Internationalism or Russification?”⁶⁷ Ukrainian literary critic Ivan Dzyuba reflected upon the breaching of Lenin’s “nationality policy” by Stalin and Khrushchev by comparing the status quo to the affirmative action strategies of the 1920s. Dzyuba found evidence of rapid, “stealthy” Russification of state institutions in Ukraine including schools and childcare, higher and technical education, cultural facilities, army, and the communist party apparatus⁶⁸. Dzyuba also noted a growing distance between the Ukrainian-speaking countryside and the Russian-speaking city, a situation similar to

⁶³ Applebaum, *Red Famine*, 76.

⁶⁴ Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire*, 21.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 27.

⁶⁶ Madina Tlostanova, “Postsocialist ≠ Postcolonial? On Post-Soviet Imaginary and Global Coloniality,” *Journal of Postcolonial Writing* 48, no. 2 (2012): 130-142.

⁶⁷ Ivan Dzyuba, *Internatsionalysm chy rusyfikatsia? (Ukr. – Internationalism or Russification?)* (Kyiv: KM Academia, 1998).

⁶⁸ Dzyuba, *Internationalism*, 101, 121-122.

that of Ukraine under the Russian empire. Dzyuba also noted the relocation of, then assimilation of Ukrainians in other Soviet republics, as well as work hierarchies where management was routinely Russian-speaking⁶⁹. All of these forces acted to reduce a specifically Ukrainian Soviet identity.

The ultimate manifestation of the ambiguous ‘affirmative action state’ was the Soviet Ukrainian state itself. Under the Soviet Union, Ukraine was called the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). In 1991 the SSR became independent Ukraine with the same boundaries. The new state entered a period of demographic, economic and industrial decline that to some extent continues today, all while retaining its Soviet infrastructure, except nuclear weapons⁷⁰, including its national institutions.

Although several postcolonial nations have constructed new capital cities, e.g., Nigeria or Tanzania, or new capitol buildings, such as Papua New Guinea or post-Soviet Kazakhstan⁷¹, Ukraine constructed neither, instead retaining both Kyiv as capital and the Soviet SSR buildings as the new homes of independent state agencies. Kyiv’s classicist capitol building was in fact designed for the Ukrainian SSR in 1934 by Volodymyr Zabolotnyi as a result of Stalin’s transfer of the capital from Kharkiv. Reflecting the political significance of this decision at the USSR level, Zabolotnyi was awarded a Stalin Prize, the Soviet Union’s highest artistic honor, for the design⁷².

Since independence, Ukraine has constructed a new national historiography, with new national myths⁷³, in a manner that has little to do with either the Soviet era or with persistent Soviet built form such as the capitol building. According to Kuzjo, today Ukraine suggests that its statehood dates back to the times of medieval Kyivan Rus, a polity that was earlier claimed by Russia as its proto-state and that is still understood by many as such in Russia today. In this historiography, Ukraine’s incorporation into

⁶⁹ Ibid., 20, 106, 145.

⁷⁰ “Nuclear Disarmament Ukraine,” NTI, accessed November 30, 2020, <https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/ukraine-nuclear-disarmament/>.

⁷¹ Vale, *Architecture, Power and National Identity*, 10.

⁷² “Ukraine,” A Wiki on National Parliament Buildings Worldwide, Plenum. Places of Power, accessed January 12, 2021, <https://www.places-of-power.org/wiki/index.php?title=Ukraine>.

⁷³ Kuzjo, “History, Memory and Nation Building.”

Russia and the Soviet Union can be understood as an anomaly in a longer, interrupted history of independence. Another example of Ukraine's new national historiography is the official portrayal of Ukraine as a "European" country – one that is "peaceful, a victim of past foreign incursions, different in political culture to Russia, with a tradition of democratic institutions, and a long history that legitimizes its independent statehood"⁷⁴. In this mythology, Ukraine is less Little Russia than it is a Switzerland of the east, as distinct from Russia as Bern is from Berlin. The inconsistencies between the socialist infrastructure of Soviet Ukraine and the new Ukrainian historiography and institutions of the 1990s and since remains an important driver of spatial transformations under decommunization that we will analyze further in subsequent sections.

Methodology

This study examines decommunization's impact on the architectural urbanism of Kyiv through a case study of the architectural, urban, and infrastructural heritage constructed as part of the celebration of Kyiv's 1500th anniversary, held in 1982 and organized by the Ukrainian SSR political leadership. We first review this heritage before investigating and analyzing the transformation of the built environment production of the celebration in the context of the post-2014 decommunization campaign.

Data collection methods include archival work and analysis of depictions of the celebration in available primary sources, including government decrees of the Council of Ministers of Ukrainian SSR, Communist Party of Ukraine, and Executive Committee of Kyiv City Council; Soviet and international media publications and documentaries; photo albums, postcards and other merchandise issued for the celebration; biographies and memoirs of the key celebration stakeholders; and architecture catalogs and textbooks such as *Architectural Face of Kyiv* (1987)⁷⁵, and *Architecture of Soviet Kyiv* (2010)⁷⁶.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 252.

⁷⁵ Serhii Kileso, *Architectural Face of Kiev*, (Kyiv: Budivel'nyk, 1987).

⁷⁶ Boris Yerofalov-Pylypchak, *Arhitektura Sovetskoho Kyieva (Rus. – Architecture of Soviet Kyiv)* (Kyiv: A+S, 2010).

Evidence of transformation of the 1982 celebration heritage was derived from the following sources: publications of state agencies involved in the decommunization campaign, e.g., the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance; media reports; terms of reference of the “Terra Dignitas” design competition⁷⁷; and personal observations by the authors of the architectural urbanistic heritage itself.

The authors conducted an analysis of 1982 artifacts, labeling each artifact according to a certain Soviet ideological narrative based on other collected data. For this article, we selected one artifact, a building or monumental complex, for each of the ideological narratives in order to track that artifact’s transformation under decommunization. Given the iconic status of these artifacts as popular symbols in Kyiv today, the study investigates the physical alterations to each of the corresponding Soviet ideological narratives under current decommunization policy.

Kyiv 1500 – An Overview of the origin, scope and meaning of the 1982 Anniversary

Motives and origins of Kyiv’s 1500th anniversary celebration in 1982

The 1970s are broadly known as a time of “stagnation” in the Soviet Union’s political and socio-economic life. In the Ukrainian SSR, stagnation was manifested in economic development, cultural and ideological policy and in the SSR’s political leadership. Bilinsky⁷⁸ describes Soviet Ukraine in this era as a “mature industrial-agricultural economy whose growth was slowing down”, citing the technological and physical aging of industry⁷⁹.

Governance in the stagnation period was associated with Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukrainian SSR in 1972-1989, and a protégé of General Secretary

⁷⁷ Department of Architecture and Urban Planning of Kyiv City Council, *Terra Dignitas International Open Competition Brief, Part I*, accessed January 14, 2021, <https://terradignitas.kga.gov.ua/en/downloads/competition-brif>.

⁷⁸ Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Shcherbitskyi, Ukraine and Kremlin Politics." *Problems of Communism* 32, no. 4 (1983): 1-20.

⁷⁹ Vitalii Vrublevskyi, *Vladimir Shcherbitskyi: pravda i vymysly. Zapiski pomoshchnika (Rus. – Volodymyr Shcherbitskyi: Truth and Fiction. Assistant’s Notes)*, (Kyiv: Dovira, 1993), 204.

Leonid Brezhnev⁸⁰. Shcherbytskyi replaced Petro Shelest, known for autonomy claims for Ukraine and its culture; the former embodied a Soviet political hardliner who embraced loyalty to Moscow⁸¹. Together with fellow party members and the government of Ukrainian SSR, in 1979 Shcherbytskyi authorized a large-scale celebration of the 1500th anniversary of the city of Kyiv foundation, to be held in 1982.

The culture of “city anniversaries” in the USSR can be traced back to the 1947 celebration of “800 years since Moscow’s foundation”. This event was promoted by Stalin’s policy of Russian nationalist revival⁸². The supposed origin date of 1147 was artificial; the anniversary year also coincided with the 30th anniversary of the October revolution. This confluence permitted the Moscow celebration to celebrate both an imagined past, and a more recent canonical Soviet historical event, a confluence that would also occur in Kyiv’s 1982 celebration. Additional such arbitrary, Soviet-inspired anniversary celebrations, according to Isayevych, were political phenomena that were widespread in Soviet cities, such as Tashkent or Yerevan, and that have continued in post-Soviet cities, such as Saint-Petersburg and Kazan.

The celebration of the 1500th anniversary of Kyiv in 1982, referencing an equally artificial 482 CE founding date for Kyiv, was a political phenomenon that was proclaimed as “republican” and that was allegedly local in its ambition. The first official announcement of the celebration appeared in 1979 in a magazine issued by Kyiv’s city committee of the Communist Party⁸³. This was the lowest possible central government level for such a publication⁸⁴, implying that the audience for the celebration was intended to be limited to the Ukrainian SSR or perhaps only residents of Kyiv. However, the magazine also quoted a decree from the Kyiv city party committee, proclaiming that the celebration would “manifest the

⁸⁰ Bilinsky, “Shherbitskyi, Ukraine,” 1983.

⁸¹ Subtelny, *Ukraine: A History*, 511-512.

⁸² Yurii Isayevych, "Yuvilei Mist: Kyiv, Lviv i znovu Kyiv" (Ukr. – City Jubilees: Kyiv, Lviv and Kyiv again), *Problemy Istorii Ukraini: dialogy, gipotezy, dzherela*, no. 16 (2007): 75-87.

⁸³ Omeljan Pritsak, "Za Kulisamy Progoloshennya 1500-littya Kyieva" (Ukr. – Behind the Scenes of the Proclamation of the 1500th Anniversary of Kyiv), *Suchasnist'* 9, no. 249 (1981): 46-54.

⁸⁴ Isayevych, “City Jubilees.”

friendship of Ukrainian, Russian, Belarusian and other Soviet peoples” while showcasing the success of “Lenin’s nationality policy”⁸⁵. Thus, the ‘local’ celebration was one that was clearly grounded in larger-scale Soviet policies to foment an acceptable, Union-friendly nationalism in Soviet republics.

The choice of date of Kyiv’s foundation, and for the celebration itself, has provoked numerous interpretations. The choice of 1982 connected not only to the purported 482 foundation for the city but to the 60 years since the formal establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922⁸⁶. This date was less canonical than the October Revolution year of 2017, but was no less important for Ukraine. The establishment of the Soviet Union marked Ukraine’s formal incorporation as a subsidiary republic, after a tumultuous time that had even included a briefly independent, non-Communist Ukrainian state in 1919-20. The anniversary date of 1982 also utilized the momentum of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow (Izbusheva 2015). Historian Omeljan Pritsak has noted that the choice of 1982 for a particular historical celebration occluded two other potential historical commemorations with nationalist implications: that of 1000 years (approximately) since the Christianization of Kyiv Rus in 988, and that of 50 years since the Soviet-induced Holodomor famine of 1932-33⁸⁷. Consistent with Soviet policy under Brezhnev, the 1982 anniversary date further ratified Soviet-linked historical events, while suppressing nationalist-leaning historical events at the same time. Pritsak argued that the celebration’s existence sought even further legitimization for Russian and Soviet rule by creating a narrative of a *common* history that tied Kyiv to Moscow, and medieval Kyivan Rus to the Soviet Union⁸⁸. Whichever motive is the true one, it is clear that the choice of 1982 as a commemoration year contradicts the image of a “local” celebration.

The putative 482 date itself was extracted using “material culture” methods, rather than mentions of the city in historical records. These former methods have been criticized by historians, such as Pritsak and Isayevych. The arbitrariness of this putatively scientific determination was indirectly confirmed by

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Pritsak, “Behind the Scenes.”

⁸⁸ Isayevych, “City Jubilees.”

First Secretary Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi's comment quoted in a 2007 interview with Petro Tolochko, former director of Archeology Institute of the Academy of Sciences of Ukrainian SSR, in which Tolochko recalled Shcherbytskyi saying, "We will celebrate the 1500th anniversary while the current generation lives, and should our descendants doubt our preciseness, let them celebrate it again⁸⁹."

Planning and organization of the celebration

The 1982 celebration was approved by the highest authorities both in Kyiv and Moscow (Figure 1). Petro Tron'ko, former Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Ukrainian SSR from 1961 to 1978 and Vice Head of the Academy of Sciences of Ukrainian SSR, is considered the author of the celebration idea⁹⁰. In 1979 the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR established an organizing committee, presided over by the Chairman of the Council Oleksandr Lyashko, who, alongside Shcherbytskyi, personally sought approval of the celebration idea from their higher-level counterparts in Moscow, Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of USSR⁹¹. The costs of the 1982 anniversary were primarily covered by the Ukrainian SSR itself through various government channels⁹². In typical Soviet fashion, all regions of the Ukrainian SSR "volunteered" time and effort by sending construction workers and engineers (see Appendix, Table 6). A more whimsical contribution was the workers' building of cafés with thematic designs inspired by each Ukrainian region's cultural identity⁹³.

⁸⁹ Igor Osipchuk, "Akademik Petr Tolochko – s prazdnovaniem 1500-letiya Kiyeva my pospeshili na 100 let" (Rus. – Academician Petr Tolochko – we were early with the 1500-th anniversary of Kyiv by 100 years), *Fakty*, May 22, 2007, <https://crime.fakty.ua/37071-akademik-petr-tolochko-quot-s-prazdnovaniem-1500-letiya-kieva-my-pospeshili-let-na-100-quot>.

⁹⁰ Oleksandr Lyashko, *Gruz pamyati: Trilogiya. Vospominaniya* (Rus. – *Burden of Memory: a Trilogy. Memoires*) (Kyiv: Delovaya Ukraina, 2001), 219.

⁹¹ Lyashko, *Burden of Memory*, 217-219.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 217.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 222.

Although major Soviet media was silent on the upcoming event throughout 1979-81⁹⁴, multiple government decrees during this time defined the celebration's scope and practicalities. Preparation for the celebration began early in 1979 and the construction of anniversary structures and spaces began that year as well. The plan for "organizational and ideological events" was approved on May 22, 1979⁹⁵, and on December 28, 1979, a special decree of the Council of Ministers of Ukrainian SSR specified the scope of public works for the celebration⁹⁶ (Figure 2). Opening events for completed projects took place throughout 1981-1982, while the principal anniversary celebration events took place on May 28-29, 1982⁹⁷. The first of these events was attended by international delegations, among them UNESCO representatives, and was held in the "Ukraïna" Palace of Culture, previously constructed in 1970⁹⁸. Another celebratory event on May 29 featured a grand theatrical show held at the freshly renovated (also for the event) 80-thousand-person capacity Republican Stadium. This was followed by multiple public celebrations throughout the city, including a carnival, a waterfront dance performance, and fireworks shows⁹⁹.

Consistent with Soviet practice of celebrating construction and culture via multiple media formats¹⁰⁰, various publications were also prepared for the anniversary. These ranged from historical textbooks, geographical atlases, photo, and art albums to merchandise items such as postcards, pins, and

⁹⁴ Pritsak, "Behind the Scenes."

⁹⁵ Lyashko, *Burden of Memory*, 220.

⁹⁶ Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, *Decree #597 from December 28, 1979, on the construction, reconstruction of social and cultural facilities and the restoration of historical and cultural monuments in connection with the preparations for the celebration of the 1500-th anniversary of the foundation of the city of Kyiv*, LIGA: ZAKON, accessed January 11, 2021 http://search.ligazakon.ua/l_doc2.nsf/link1/KP790597.html.

⁹⁷ Anastasia Izbushcheva, "Podgotovka in provedeniye yubileya goroda v sovetskoi istorii kak sposob sohraneniya i zakrepleniya istoricheskoi i kul'turnoi pamyati" (Rus. – Preparing and Conducting Anniversary of the City in Soviet History as a Way to Preserve and Consolidate Historical and Cultural Memory), *Vestnik Omskogo universiteta* 3, no. 7 (2015): 24-35.

⁹⁸ Oles' Honchar, *Shchodennyky: Part 2 (Diaries: Part 2)* (Kyiv: Veselka, 2003), 521.

⁹⁹ Valentyn Zgurskyi, "Kolybel' Narodov-Bratyev" (Rus. – A Cradle of Brother Peoples), *Ogoniok*, no. 21, May 1982, 16-17.

¹⁰⁰ See Ruder, *Building Stalinism*, for more examples.

stamps¹⁰¹. Celebratory medals were popular in the USSR, and accordingly the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the USSR decreed the minting of a variety of “Kyiv 1500” medals of honor (Presidium of Supreme Council of USSR 1982). Outside of Ukraine, the 1982 celebration events were depicted in the popular Soviet magazine “Ogoniok”¹⁰² and the nationwide TV show “Travelers’ Club”¹⁰³. Internationally, UNESCO issued a special resolution in favor of the anniversary¹⁰⁴ and devoted a 1982 issue of its “Courier” magazine to it, entitled “Kiev: 1500 years of culture”¹⁰⁵.

Soviet ideological narratives and the built environment of the Kyiv 1500 celebration

The built environment component of the celebration was substantial. In the abovementioned Council of Ministers’ 1979 decree announcing public works, 108 planned projects were grouped into six spreadsheets by function (“public and sports facilities”, “historical and cultural heritage”, etc.; see Appendix). Apart from works of architecture and monumental art, the list includes a number of public space and infrastructure projects, such as the reconstruction of ten city squares and an extension of the public transport system. Comparing the intended construction deadline with the date of actual project completions, one sees that many deadlines were extended beyond the celebration date due to construction delays. For instance, the new building for the Central Scientific Library of the Academy of Sciences, projected to be completed in April 1982, was only finished in 1989¹⁰⁶. Even the celebration plan scope of construction itself was exceeded: several additional projects beyond the December 1979 list were ultimately built as part of the commemoration¹⁰⁷.

¹⁰¹ Lyashko, *Burden of Memory*, 220-221.

¹⁰² Zgurskyi, “A Cradle.”

¹⁰³ RadianskeKino7, “Klub puteshestvennikov. Kyiv (1983)” (Rus. – “Travellers’ Club. Kyiv (1983)), YouTube video, 54:51, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bu23Gkksad0&t=1356s>.

¹⁰⁴ UNESCO, *The 1,500th anniversary of the city of Kiev* (Belgrade: UNESCO General Conference, 1980), 66-67, accessed January 11, 2021, <https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000114029.locale=en>.

¹⁰⁵ Pavlo Zagrebnyi, “Kiev: 1,500 years of culture,” *The UNESCO Courier* 35, no. 4 (1982), 4-9.

¹⁰⁶ “Vernadsky National Library,” SkyscraperPage.com, accessed January 13, 2021, <http://skyscraperpage.com/cities/?buildingID=74051>.

¹⁰⁷ Lyashko, *Burden of Memory*, 235.

Depictions of the city's ancient history through architecture and monumental art were only part of the celebration plan, which also included “numerous works of the monumental propaganda”¹⁰⁸. The final inventory of celebration-related constructions emerged as a result of at least three reviews¹⁰⁹ – by the party committee of the city of Kyiv, the Ukraine SSR Committee, and the Central Committee in Moscow, the USSR's highest party body.

In an analysis of the 1982 celebration's ideological narratives, Ukrainian historian Serhii Tolochko emphasized three concepts: the “people's friendship” between Ukraine and the rest of the Soviet Union, particularly Russia, the “cradle of three brother nations” (Ukrainian, Russian and Belarusian), and the “reunification of Ukraine with Russia”¹¹⁰. The presence of these fraternal and Soviet-friendly concepts linked the celebration to Soviet nationality policy, presenting Kyiv's foundation as a historical starting point in a Russo-Ukrainian “friendship” sanctified by the passage of the ages.

Alongside the two narratives celebrating Kyiv's alleged age and the narrative celebrating Russo-Ukrainian “peoples' friendship”, two additional ideological narratives are clearly and unmistakably visible in the celebration plan. One is the cult of Lenin, the Communist Party, and the history of the Russian Revolution, and a second is the Soviet narrative of “the Great Patriotic War”. These four ideological narratives were understood to comprise the majority of the propagandistic message of the Kyiv-1500 celebration's architectural urbanism and monumental art. Accordingly, the study allocated and organized the built production (realized projects) of the celebration into four categories corresponding to these narratives (Figure 3).

These four ideological narratives/categories provided a means of selecting representative built projects from the 1982 celebration for further study, in order to understand their transformation under decommunization. Four of the most expressive and significant projects are examined further below: the

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 221.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 220.

¹¹⁰ Serhii Tolochko, “Sviatkuvannia 1500-richchya Kyieva 1982 roku: Ideologichni aspekt” (Ukr. – Celebration of the 1500- th Anniversary of Kyiv in 1982: Ideological Aspect), *Kyiv's'ki istorychni studii* 1, no. 8 (2019): 73-78.

Founders' Monument, the Peoples' Friendship Arch complex, the Mother Motherland monumental statue, museum, and complex, and the Lenin Museum.

Narrative I: "Kyiv, the Mother of Russian Cities"

Kyiv is routinely referred to as "the Mother of Russian cities". This syncretic historic narrative was heavily promoted by the 1982¹¹¹ celebration. The commemorative book *Architectural Face of Kyiv* album proclaimed Kyiv as an ancient political and cultural center of all Eastern Slavs¹¹² and thus as a predecessor of Moscow in this role. This narrative was physically ratified in the 1982 celebration by a number of new and restored sites, highlighting the historical age of the city and its proto-Russian quality. In this category were those projects that addressed the ancient history of the city as a capital of Kyivan Rus, such as churches and a reconstructed fragment of the medieval Golden Gate. Local authorities also initiated historical reconstructions of 19C sites such as the Andriivskiy Descent and Gostynnyi Dvir complex¹¹³. The "Mother" narrative was also manifested through elements of new construction, such as Kyivan Rus-themed decorations on the modernist "Kyivan Rus" cinema (1979), the Zhytniy market hall (1980), the "Kyivan Rus" hotel (1979), and, later, the Golden Gate metro station (1989).

The central myth of Kyiv's foundation is connected with the legendary figures of the city's "founders", the brothers Kyi, Shchek, and Khoryv and their sister Lybid. As part of the 1982 Celebration monumental sculpture program, a monument to the Founders of Kyiv depicting these legendary figures was erected in 1982 by sculptor V. Z. Borodai and architect N. M. Feshchenko and placed along the Dnipro River waterfront. The monument depicted three male warriors and one female on a boat, "arriving, as they were fifteen centuries ago"¹¹⁴. The statue, while literally representing four individuals, has a rather obvious allegorical meaning as well: three Slavic peoples (Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus), unified by the Dnipro River.

¹¹¹ Lyashko, *Burden of Memory*, 219.

¹¹² Killeso, *Architectural Face*, 25.

¹¹³ Lyashko, *Burden of Memory*, 228-232.

¹¹⁴ RadianskeKino7, Traveller's Club.

Uniquely for the four cases examined in this study, the Founders' monument has not changed in any way under decommunization. Rather, it has been celebrated by independent Ukraine, gaining additional recognition by being depicted on Ukraine's interim national currency in the 1990s¹¹⁵ and being replicated, with an almost exact copy placed on the newly reconstructed Independence Square (Maidan) in 2001¹¹⁶. In this way was a Soviet-sponsored founding myth placed at the symbolic center of Kyiv. The original monument remains on site, having been temporarily removed for restoration in 2010¹¹⁷. And in 2018 yet another replica Founders' monument was installed as a signpost on the highway connecting Kyiv to Zhuliany airport. Probably the most convincing sign that independent Ukraine has embraced this Soviet-sponsored ideological narrative of ancient Kyiv as a mother of Eastern Slavic civilization is the fact that UINP, the government's decommunization supervision agency, has placed the Founders' monument icon on its website as a paradigm of valuable historical monuments that are to be preserved (Figure 4).

Narrative II: "Peoples' Friendship"

To promote the Soviet narrative of Kyiv as a shared historical capital of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus, the celebration promoted a second narrative of friendship between the peoples of the three supposedly equal republics of the Union in the present (Soviet) day. To ratify Kyiv's role as a keystone of this "friendship", the "Order of People's Friendship" was awarded by the Soviet government to the city of Kyiv in 1982¹¹⁸. This order was historically awarded to organizations, cities, and even Soviet republics

¹¹⁵ "Avtor pamyatnika osnovatelyam Kieva podal v sud na Natsbank" (Rus. – The author of the monument to the Founders of Kyiv sued the National Bank), Korrespondent.net, March 3, 2010, <https://korrespondent.net/kyiv/1053040-smi-avtor-pamyatnika-osnovatelyam-kieva-podal-v-sud-na-nacbank> (accessed October 21, 2020).

¹¹⁶ "Shche ody n pamiatnyk z' iavyvsia y tsentri Kyeve" (Ukr. – One more monument appeared in the center of Kyiv)," Korrespondent.net., November 22, 2001, <https://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/237340-u-centri-kieva-z-yavivysya-shche-odin-pamyatnik> (accessed January 13, 2021).

¹¹⁷ "Posle restavratsiiotkryt pamyatnik osnovatelyam Kieva" (Rus. – The monument to the Founders of Kyiv reopened after restoration), Interfax-Ukraine, May 5, 2010, <https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/39952.html> (accessed October 21, 2020).

¹¹⁸ Tolochko, "Celebration."

that had merited special favor by the central government. And despite the existence of the USSR's nationality policy promoting equality between Soviet republics, spatial and symbolic hierarchies among the three parties to the "Peoples' Friendship" were explicitly visible during the celebration's official ceremonies and in the media. For example, a special anniversary-themed article in the popular Moscow-based "Ogoniok" written by Valentyn Zgurskyi, Head of the Kyiv City Executive Committee, stated that "Ukrainian culture developed and matured in interaction with advanced Russian culture"¹¹⁹. Additionally, the 1987 *Architectural Face of Kiev* remarked in its preface upon the "enormous struggle" of Ukrainian people for "reunification with the fraternal Russian people"¹²⁰. And a grand theatrical performance held at the Republican Stadium in May 1982 featured a banner saying "Vmeste Na Veka" ("Together for the Centuries to Come" in Russian), which then shifted to display the three flags of Soviet Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus¹²¹. The message could not have been more clear, nor more inaccurate, as the three "unified" peoples would be politically separate within less than ten years of this celebration.

The "people's friendship" narrative was expressed most explicitly in the 1982 anniversary celebration by the People's Friendship Arch monument constructed atop the steep right bank of the Dnipro near the end of Kreshchatyk, Kyiv's most important street. The Arch, a vault presumably of steel construction and covered with 50-meter-long titanium tiles, was designed as part of a larger park and monumental complex consisting of an observation deck, seating tiers and a sculptural ensemble of two monumental groups – one depicting two Soviet men, a Russian and Ukrainian, holding an Order of People's Friendship, and another depicting the signing of the Pereyaslav Treaty in 1654 by delegates of the Russian Czar and the Ukrainian Cossack state. This agreement, little known outside the Soviet Union but foundational and meaningful in Ukraine, demonstrated Ukraine's apparently voluntary incorporation into the Russian Empire. Another monument to be realized at an undisclosed location would have

¹¹⁹ Zgurskyi, "A Cradle," 17.

¹²⁰ Killeso, *Architectural Face*, 25.

¹²¹ Olympic NSC, "1500-richchya Kyieva na Respublikanskomu (Ukr. – 1500-th anniversary of Kyiv at the Republican Stadium), YouTube video, 12:09, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PKTBoE8e7z0&t=5s>.

signified the “reunification” of ethnic Ukrainian territories into the Ukrainian SSR following the Soviet annexation of Western Ukraine from Poland in 1939 (see Appendix, Table 4 for the full list of monuments included in the celebration plan).

The Friendship Arch’s ideological narrative, more explicitly pro-Russian than the Founders of Kyiv ensemble, has also proven to be more visible, and vulnerable, to decommunization. In 2017, UINP director Volodymyr Viatrovych suggested transforming the site into a pantheon of “Ukrainian Heroes”¹²². One year later, Foreign Affairs Minister Pavlo Klimkin suggested via Twitter “to dismantle the arch for scrap metal”¹²³. Despite these threats of transformation or demolition, the People’s Friendship Arch and its associated monumental ensemble has thus far [2020] preserved its integrity, perhaps by being trivialized. Its current function is rather lighthearted: during warmer months, the arch plaza provides space for a mobile amusement park venue. The Arch’s spectacular and highly visible location may also have benefited it: Kyiv’s Mayor Klitschko in 2019 funded the construction of a glass pedestrian bridge to connect the site to adjacent hills, attracting crowds of sightseers to the arch and its monuments.

The arch has not been inviolable, however. It experienced several temporary interventions throughout the 2010s, often linked to international events (Figure 5). During the European football championship hosted by Ukraine and Poland in June 2012, the city of Kyiv and Ukraine’s EU delegation inaugurated a “European Village under the Arch of Friendship”¹²⁴, a space for mobile exhibitions and

¹²² “Memorial ukrains’kih heroiv mozhe rozmistytysia na misti arky Druzhby Narodiv (Ukr. – The Memorial to Ukrainian Heroes might appear on the site of People’s Friendship Arch), *Istorychna Pravda*, June 5, 2017, <http://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/59354eecdac6d/> (accessed October 21, 2020).

¹²³ Pavlo Klimkin (@pavloklimkin), “Pokladyuchy kvity do pam’yatnykiv Shevchenkovi ta Hrushevs’komu u Den’ Sobornosti, meni spalo na dumku, shcho u nas zalyshyutsia i inshi symvoly na kshtalt Arky druzhby narodiv. Chy my u symvolakh zaplutalysia, chy, mozhe, nak cherez te, shcho ne zalyshylosiya pioneriv, yaki b na metalobrucht rozibraly? (While laying flowers to the monuments of Shevchenko and Hrushevskyi on the Day of Collegiality, a thought came to my mind that there remain symbols such as Peoples’ Friendship Arch. Did we get lost in those symbols, or, maybe, there are no young pioneers left to disassemble the arch for scrap metal? – Ukr.)” Twitter, January 22, 2018, <https://twitter.com/PavloKlimkin/status/955389785736130560>.

¹²⁴ “The European Village,” European Union External Action, https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/images/top_stories/2012_kiev_europeanvillage_programm_en.pdf (accessed October 21, 2020).

project presentations aimed to promote Ukraine's European integration. This was certainly a different form of friendship than that originally communicated by the Arch. Another rather frivolous transformation of the Arch stemmed from the siting of the Eurovision song contest in Kyiv. The arch was covered with a rainbow pattern for three weeks in commemoration of the "Celebrate Diversity" motto of the contest. But a third alteration may have been most lasting: in 2018 human rights activists put a sticker on the Arch mimicking a crack in the metal vault. The intention was to raise awareness of the existence of citizens of Ukraine detained in Russia for political reasons¹²⁵. Visually quiet but serious and troubling in its implications, the sticker currently [2020] remains on the Arch.

Overall, the Arch's ideological message of Slavic friendship remains fraught, fueled by the ongoing Russia-Ukraine military conflict. Yet no permanent transformations have occurred on the site. Nor has the toponym "Peoples' Friendship" proven problematic: it is perceived as a neutral term and remains a popular local toponym, with a public park, boulevard, and metro station in Kyiv all bearing its name. The Arch's recent history of temporary appropriations instead indicates that its ideological message has been amenable to redirection (from the Soviet "friendship" to one with Europe), as well as being amenable to subtle but pointed critique (the "crack in the friendship").

Narrative III: "The Great Patriotic War"

To the organizers of Kyiv's 1500th anniversary, those monuments and projects that were linked to the commemoration of WWII, the Soviet "Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945" [GPW], bore a particularly solemn significance¹²⁶. Kyiv had been first occupied by the Nazis in 1941, then reconquered by the Soviet Red Army in 1943. The city physically suffered from mass ruination, especially in the city center, and

¹²⁵ "Kyiv human rights activists 'crack' Druzhby Narodiv Arch in support of political prisoners," 112 Ukraine, November 24, 2018, <https://112.international/politics/kyiv-human-rights-activists-crack-druzhby-narodiv-arch-in-support-of-political-prisoners-34474.html> (accessed October 21, 2020).

¹²⁶ Lyashko, *Burden of Memory*, 231.

from mass slaughter: much of the city's population, including nearly its entire Jewish population, were murdered¹²⁷.

While there were already a variety of GPW commemoration sites, such as Avraam Miletsky's 1957 Obelisk and Alley of Glory near the Arsenalna Metro station, the Kyiv 1500 celebration added dramatically and ineluctably to this inventory of war memorials. In 1981, a 108-meter-high monument, called *Rodina Mat'* in Russian, or "Mother Motherland" in English, was completed on a hill amongst the golden church domes on the right bank, high above the Dnipro, forever modifying this historic skyline. Mother, as she is often called, was accompanied by a huge open-air GPW memorial complex, as well as a GPW war museum contained within her base¹²⁸. The complex's opening on May 9, 1981 was the only event of the Kyiv 1500 celebration attended by elderly USSR General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.

The idea of an open-air war museum on the highly visible site first emerged in 1973. An early museum and Motherland design was developed by architect Yevhen Stamo and sculptor Yevgeny Vuchetich. The latter-named had also designed the even-more famous Motherland in Volgograd (Stalingrad), as well as a Soviet war monument in Treptower Park in then-East Berlin¹²⁹. For Vuchetich, the monument in Kyiv presumably completed a grandiose concept of three monuments representing the Red Army's progress westward from 1943, the turning point in the war, to 1945, the fall of Berlin¹³⁰. Vuchetich died in 1974, however, and the Motherland project was taken over by sculptor Vasyl Borodai, designer of the Kyiv Founders' monument¹³¹. Borodai was supported by a large team of architects, engineers, and artists.

¹²⁷ Yerofalov-Pylypchak, *Arhitektura Sovetskoho*, 286.

¹²⁸ See "Motherland Monument," SkyscraperPage.com, accessed October 21, 2020, <http://skyscraperpage.com/cities/?buildingID=5677>, on the basic parameters of the Mother Motherland monument.

¹²⁹ Anatoliy Beliaev, Alla Istomina, Yuriy Latysh, Grygorii Maksymenko, Valerii Tsybukh, and Igor Shpak, *Shcherbytskyi Volodymyr Vasilliovych. Politychnyi portret na foni epokhy (Ukr. – Volodymyr Vassilliovych Shcherbytskyi: Political Portrait on the Background of the Era)* (Kyiv: ADEF Ukraina Publishing, 2018), 263-266.

¹³⁰ Beliaev et al., *Shcherbytskyi*, 266.

¹³¹ Yerofalov-Pylypchak, *Arhitektura Sovetskoho*, 575.

Motherland more or less copies the concept of Volgograd's dramatic ferroconcrete monument, a woman holding a sword. But the Ukrainian Mother Motherland is more static and symmetrical, somewhat resembling a fiercer Statue of Liberty (Kyiv's statue is approximately 10 meters higher than the American). Mother holds a sword in one hand, and a shield with the Soviet coat of arms in the other. Kyiv's Motherland statue is also more stable than the concrete Volgograd Motherland, because her steel 'carcass' is strengthened by a full metal coat of welded thin metal tiles. This construction technology was developed with the expertise of Kyiv-based electric welding institutes, aircraft design bureaus, and utilized early computer modeling¹³².

Despite the sacred significance of the GPW and the dramatic and sophisticated technology of the project, the Motherland complex's reception by SSR officials was ambivalent. Influential Ukrainian writer Oles' Honchar wrote in his diary (i.e., confidentially) in August 1981 that "Kyians [residents of Kyiv] are discussing the "woman" monument again. There is a rumor that the hill underneath is eroding, all [the] thousands-of-tons construction is sagging, and what if this bureaucratic Valkyrie falls... [...] What public control would hold accountable this dull, bureaucratic voluntarism and pseudo-patriotic pomposity [...]?"¹³³.

Under decommunization, the Motherland status and associated complex have been immune to explicit alteration, for Decommunization laws make exceptions for WWII museums, memorials, and marks of distinction. Yet even this sacred memorial to war sacrifice has experienced adaptation to provide it with additional, explicitly Ukrainian meaning. In 2015 the museum-memorial complex was renamed the "National Museum of History of Ukraine in WWII"¹³⁴, a gesture toward refocusing the war narrative contained within. Ceremonial dates have also shifted: under President Poroshenko (2015-2019), the date

¹³²Ibid., 572-585.

¹³³ Honchar, *Diaries*, 472.

¹³⁴ Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, *Memorial complex "National museum of history of the Great Patriotic War" renamed into "National museum of history of Ukraine in the Second World War. Memorial complex"*, Government Portal, accessed October 21, 2020, <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/248335353>.

for annual war commemoration ceremonies at the complex was shifted from May 9, the Soviet (and Russian) “Victory Day”, to May 8, a “Day of Memory and Reconciliation”. The poppy flower, associated in Western Europe with WWI, became a symbol of this new, specifically Ukrainian holiday. Mother Motherland has been decorated in a poppy wreath for May events since 2015, and some of the military vehicles of the open-air exhibition alongside the statue were painted at this time in the colors of Ukraine’s national flag.

The Soviet war museum in the basement of the Motherland monument has an ideological message that cannot be misinterpreted. A Soviet soldier crushing a swastika underfoot in the lobby is a triumphant, literal, and violent expression of Soviet victory that is quite different from the more abstract representations of victory found in Western European and US WWII memorials. Since the Revolution of Dignity of 2014, the museum has been annotated on its ground (lobby) level in a seemingly ad-hoc manner, with an inexpensive exhibition dedicated to the ongoing proxy war with Russia in Eastern Ukraine. Two upper floors, one a dark circular pavilion of WWII exhibitions and the other a bright, Byzantium temple-like dome with golden USSR Hero stars carved into marble walls, remain unaltered from their 1981 appearance. Another change, analogous to the carnival held at the Friendship Arch, has popularized the otherwise overwhelmingly serious tone of the museum: in 2019, the monument’s basement became a venue for a wax museum entitled “The Museum of the Ukrainian Nation’s Emergence”.

Mother Motherland is explicitly Soviet, and the most visible sign of her Soviet meaning is the Soviet red star and hammer and sickle found on her shield, which unsurprisingly has attracted criticism in the third decommunization era. Former UINP director Viatrovych continuously criticized the monument between 2014 and 2019, and new UINP director Anton Drobovych stated in early 2020 that the Soviet symbols might still be removed at a future date¹³⁵. But even if her Soviet symbols were removed, Mother

¹³⁵ Viktoriia Novikova, “Dekomunizatsiya i naivshcha sporuda v Ukraini. Koly znimut’ herb USSR iz ”Bat’kivshyny-Materi” (Ukr. – Decommunization and the tallest building in Ukraine. When the USSR coat of arms will be removed from the “Motherland?”), *Radio Svoboda*, February 2, 2020, <https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/30410520.html>.

herself is sure to remain, a permanent mark of the Soviet Union's Pharaonic approach to memorializing its GPW victory. Mother's sheer scale, her mammoth presence, may explain the most recent balancing of her "problematic" heritage with Ukrainian meaning. On August 24, 2020, Ukraine's Independence Day, a 90-meter-high flag post and giant national flag of Ukraine was installed in the middle of the memorial complex. Commissioned by Kyiv City Council and "financed through private donations" according to Kyiv's Mayor¹³⁶, the flag post overshadows an elevated GPW eternal flame and, to a viewer entering via the principal entrance, overshadows and even obscures the Motherland statue itself. (Figure 6)

In this manner, the GPW memorial complex and Mother Motherland monument, one of Kyiv's most recognizable symbols and certainly the city's most visible Soviet symbol, have been monumentally modified to accommodate and incorporate Ukraine's sovereign identity as well as the nation's most recent war history. Within the museum, the Soviet commemoration of victory has been annotated with a much more modest memorial to 2014 that may be more meaningful to contemporary Ukrainians. Ukrainian identity has also been asserted outside by the flag/pole but the war memorial and Mother herself remain unaltered, her Soviet shield intact at the present time [2020]. The toponym "Victory", like "Peoples' Friendship", has also remained intact, with nearby places like Victory Avenue and Victory Square, another Kyiv 1500 project, remaining unchanged. In 2017 Mayor Klitschko further decommunized the concept of "victory" by arguing that "victory is a broad notion" and thus "not political at all"¹³⁷.

Narrative IV: "Marxism-Leninism"

Among the ideologies embedded in the urban heritage of the Kyiv 1500 celebration, are two "hard-line" narratives (see the Concepts and Literatures section for a definition of "hard-line") embodying core Soviet policies and values. The first of these narratives is the Great Patriotic War. The second hardline narrative is related to the core of the Soviet state, communist ideology itself, typically referred to

¹³⁶ "Klitschko opens pedestrian bridge in Kyiv," *Ukrinform*, May 27, 2019, <https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-society/2708971-klitschko-opens-pedestrian-bridge-in-kyiv.html>.

¹³⁷ "Klitschko – pereimenuvannya prospektu Peremohy – ne glavne zavdannya" (Ukr. – Klitschko – Renaming of Victory Prospect is not a priority task), *BBC Ukraine*, April 12, 2017, <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/news-39581677>.

as “Marxism-Leninism” in Soviet times. Institutions related to this narrative are state institutions such as the Communist Party, its youth branch *Komsomol*, Soviet trade unions, and the Academy of Sciences. Each of these institutions received a new headquarters as part of the 1982 celebration or, in the case of the Academy of Sciences, a new library complex (now the Vernadskyi national library). In other words, the 1982 celebration provided the grounds for a large-scale facilities renovation for key Communist institutions.

The 1982 events also financed additions to the Soviet monumental pantheon in Kyiv, with new monuments of state-approved canonical writers, scientists, and statesmen of Ukrainian origin. The figure of Vladimir Lenin remained at the center of the Marxism-Leninism narrative, both figuratively and physically, in the form of numerous new Lenin statues. The profusion of Lenins, already extant in Kyiv prior to 1982, was reinforced by the celebration plan. Pre-1982, the city’s central axis of Khreshchatyk Street and October Revolution Square (now Independence Square), already had two monumental depictions of Lenin – a 1946 monument and a 1977 monumental pantheon of The Great October Revolution featuring Lenin at its center. These figures of Lenin were the primary targets of decommunization, with both centrally located monuments removed. The first, in Independence Square, was removed after student protests in 1991¹³⁸, and the second was torn down during the Euromaidan.

The celebration program contributed to the Marxist-Leninist cult by financing construction of a Branch of the Central Museum of Lenin in the beginning of Khreshchatyk Street. This was a highly visible location, at the bottom of the incline leading to the SSR capitol complex. The museum’s building was designed in a hybrid classical and brutalist style¹³⁹ softened by a white marble-decorated facade. A 1982 documentary emphasized the museum’s role linking Ukraine to Marxism-Leninism. In the documentary’s beginning scenes, the building hosts First Secretary Volodymyr Shcherbitskyi solemnly

¹³⁸ Revolution on Granite” was the name of a student strike protesting the results of the 1990 elections in which the Communist Party won the majority of votes. The protest was located on the Great October Revolution square (now – Independence square). See Lyashko, *Burden of Memory*, 231, on the removal of the Revolution monument crowned with Lenin statue.

¹³⁹ See Yerofalov-Pylypchak, *Arhitektura Sovetskoho*, 142, on the museum’s architectural design.

proclaiming that “Vladimir Illich [Lenin] was connected to Ukraine with thousands of threads”¹⁴⁰. The scene ends with government officials gathered beneath the white marble statue of Lenin in the museum’s atrium hall.

With its obviously Communist, Soviet, and Russian associations, the Lenin Museum experienced alteration in all three eras of decommunization. After Ukraine became independent, the building was first renamed to “Ukrainian House”. It was turned into an exhibition space. In 1993 the interior monument of Lenin and the former museum’s exhibition of Lenin artifacts were removed. In the tumultuous years that followed, the building frequently served as a venue for public protests, from the Orange revolution in 2004 to protests on state language issues in 2012. During the Euromaidan Revolution of Dignity of 2013-2014, the building was a contested space: it was first occupied by protesters and later by government-sympathizing riot police.

In the aftermath of the Euromaidan, with the protest movement victorious, a design competition, with a theme of “reinventing public space in Kyiv’s city core and commemorating the Revolution of Dignity” (also referred to as “Terra Dignitas”), was announced by Kyiv City Hall in 2015. The competition’s scope included a nomination for a new vision for the former Lenin Museum, now Ukrainian House¹⁴¹. The competition brief emphasized the lack of existing programming for the building and the unsuccessful earlier attempts to develop it as a public and commercial space¹⁴². The brief also called for preserving the vaguely defined “creative freedom” that had surrounded the building during the protests. Finally, the brief stated the position of the former museum as a place where “the role of Ukraine in the large family of European nations” could be embraced. The winning entry, entitled “The Place Where Ukraine Meets Europe”, rather explicitly acknowledged the nation’s proposed pivot in geopolitical orientations. Architecturally, the proposal re-scaled the building’s volume to “better fit the human

¹⁴⁰ Pavel Pavlov, "Kievu – 1500 let. 1982 god. Video" (Rus. – Kyiv turns 1500. Year 1982, Video), YouTube video, 22:00, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bvct9HC_DY8.

¹⁴¹ “Terra Dignitas.”

¹⁴² Ibid.

scale”¹⁴³, and it redesigned and reprogrammed indoor and outdoor public spaces as well (Figure 7). This winning proposal was never realized.

While its programmatic future remained undefined, the vacant Ukrainian House experienced other changes in the third era of decommunization. In 2016 bas-reliefs depicting the Soviet virtues of revolution and labor and featuring Lenin’s quotes were removed from the facade by the Ukrainian House administration in response to the new decommunization laws¹⁴⁴. The most recent proposal concerning Ukrainian House emerged in 2019 when newly elected President Zelenskyi decided to move his office there. This would have made Ukrainian House a sort of White House, but the project, though made public in June 2019¹⁴⁵, was ultimately postponed. The future use of the former Lenin Museum remains unclear, nearly thirty years after independence. Burdened by its previous explicitly Marxist-Leninist, Soviet, and Russian associations, yet valuable because of its prominent location and monumental appearance, the Ukrainian House is a sort of post-Soviet white elephant, repurposed and renamed to reflect a new national identity, yet remaining largely out of use and subject to numerous failed schemes. But no structure can remain forever vacant: this most Soviet of structures will either find a new, Ukrainian-acceptable use, or it may eventually be demolished, in the manner of East Berlin’s Palast der Republik, another Communist white elephant vacated in 1990 and demolished by 2008.

Discussion

The celebration of the 1500th anniversary of Kyiv in 1982 was a large-scale implantation of Soviet ideology into city space at the time of its construction, and it has since become an unconscious measuring stick for the efficacy of decommunization’s third wave. The built products of the 1982 anniversary were

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ Olga Balashova, "Yak z Ukrainskoho Domu znyaly shkiru. Neevylikovna hvoroba dekomunizatsii" (Ukr. – How Ukrainian House got deprived of its skin. The incurable disease of decommunization), *Ukrainska Pravda*, August 19, 2016, <https://life.pravda.com.ua/culture/2016/08/19/216764/>.

¹⁴⁵ Iryna Isachenko, "Tsitadel vs. Open Space: Obsuzhdenie kontseptsii novogo ofisa Prezidenta Ukrainy" (Rus. – Citadel vs. Open Scape: Discussion of the Concept of the New President’s Office), *Pragmatika Media*, July 4, 2019, <https://life.pravda.com.ua/culture/2016/08/19/216764/>.

the last major city-shaping effort of Soviet Kyiv, with delayed projects being completed up to the verge of the USSR's collapse. The celebration created a network of new buildings, monuments, and public spaces, each with complex and unique designs, semiotics, and political significances. In practice, much of the celebration's architectural urbanism carries more than one ideological narrative, and many of these buildings and spaces also interact with each other within the larger urban space of Kyiv, making the larger city itself a sort of 'urbanisme parlante' speaking a physically variable, but ideologically consistent Soviet message, even if many of the 1982 celebration structures have a utilitarian function and today might not be immediately recognized as products with ideological purpose or significance. This study's examination of four of the most ideologically straightforward celebration projects provides the following findings on late Soviet urban design politics, as well as on the urbanistic meaning of Soviet nationality policy.

First, the celebration's heritage demonstrates a coexistence of "historical" and "modern socialist" narratives within the body of Soviet monumental propaganda. The 1982 celebration, given its theme of historical commemoration, was explicitly past-oriented, grounding conceptions of the present (such as "friendship of peoples") in historical events. Those monuments attributed to socialist achievements and political ideologies, such as the Lenin museum, were equally legacy-oriented, albeit within a shorter timeframe. This interpretation aligns the 1982 celebration's architectural urbanism with Paperny's "Culture 2". But unlike the Stalinist conservative shift from modernism to classicism in the 1930s, the Kyiv-1500 projects are stylistically diverse and even eclectic. At the same time, they can also be dogmatic and monotonous, as in the Lenin museum where a somewhat original building design accommodated yet another iteration of the canonized cult, another accumulation of relics and artifacts for obligatory pilgrimages by the faithful. Why this historical turn in late Soviet ideology? Perhaps the period of "stagnation", with its confirmed fascination for self-celebratory orders and distinctions, made the historical narrative of Soviet-Russian history more inspiring than simply celebrating the short reach of traditional communist rule. If this were to be the case, then the 1982 celebration's architectural urbanism

would support the notion of a “performative shift”¹⁴⁶, from traditional communist propaganda to a deflated sense of meaning by the 1980s: a precursor, as it were, to the even more vociferous post-Soviet celebration of various nationalities’ histories that would follow the Union’s 1991 breakup.

Secondly, the celebration legacy indicates that many popular and uncritically accepted sites of today’s ‘historical Kyiv’ were in fact restored or recreated by the Soviets. Kyiv’s acceptance of a Soviet-constructed national past is not unique. In his examination of the architectural urbanism of the post-Soviet world, Owen Hatherley found cities in Poland, Latvia and East Germany, where “the delightful old town was... created by communism”¹⁴⁷. In Kyiv, this reality is no secret, so it must not be entirely unwelcome; in other words, the Soviet construction of much of Kyiv’s historical heritage is tacitly accepted. Is this because the Ukrainian meaning of these monuments supersedes any possible Soviet associations? Whatever the cause of this comparative oversight of Soviet associations in historical “Ukrainian monuments such as the Founders’ statue, this study demonstrates Ukrainian authorities’ neglect of Soviet-era historical reconstructions as targets of decommunization.

Thirdly, the celebration history provides a new perspective on the envisioned narrative of Kyiv and Soviet Ukraine during the late USSR period. The limited statehood of the Ukrainian SSR, explained by Terry Martin¹⁴⁸ as an “affirmative action” strategy, provided legislation and an administrative apparatus to organize and fund the 1982 celebration, while Moscow authorities indirectly initiated the celebration through the Academy of Sciences and closely monitored the scope and character of its public works. The fictional historical age of Kyiv served multifold purposes within the celebration. It emphasized a non-western origin for Slavic and Russian civilization, and it advocated what Pritsak called¹⁴⁹ the *status quo ante* of Russia/USSR territorial claims, where Kyiv was presented as Moscow’s predecessor, thereby making the city a part of Russian history. At the same time, commemoration projects like Lenin’s

¹⁴⁶ See Yurchak, *Everything was forever*, on a more detailed description of the “performative shift”.

¹⁴⁷ Hatherley, *Landscapes of Communism*, 311.

¹⁴⁸ Martin, *The Affirmative Action*.

¹⁴⁹ Pritsak, “Behind the Scenes.”

museum and Mother Motherland reinforced previous Soviet architectural urbanism efforts like the Stalinist-era reconstruction of Kreshchatyk, further codifying Kyiv's status as an important *Soviet* city, at the core of the Soviet project, as explained by Yaroslav Hrytsak¹⁵⁰.

Examination of the "Peoples' Friendship" narrative-related projects arguably confirms the decay of the affirmative action policy observed by Ivan Dzyuba¹⁵¹. The celebration's emphasis on three "brother" peoples – Ukrainian, Russian and Belarusian, together with the implications of superiority of Russian national culture, seem related to Dzyuba's concerns of "stealth Russification" and the accelerated "merger" of nations under Russian dominance¹⁵². The role of the People's Friendship Arch and other projects in this narrative assist in transforming the understanding of Soviet nationality policy from affirmative action to a more colonial perspective. This suggests that viewing "Peoples' Friendship"-related sites from the standpoint of postcolonial theory will be productive.

When we examine the post-independence transformation of the selected Kyiv 1500 sites under decommunization, the spatial effects of decommunization appear to be moderate. Annotation, rather than demolition, appears to be the primary effect of decommunization in the built environment created by the 1982 anniversary. With its focus on specific personal and institutional names, the Soviet state, and communist symbols, decommunization laws seem to have been legally and procedurally ineffective in decommunizing Kyiv's 1982-related architectural urbanism. With respect to monumental art, however, decommunization's purpose and effects are clearer: specifically Soviet monuments, especially those of Lenin, have been removed, while slightly more abstract ones, such as Mother Motherland, have been annotated or neglected. The various attempts to "Ukrainize" monuments showcases the cultural struggle implicit in Vale's concept of mediated monuments, inseparable from media campaigns defining their interpretation¹⁵³.

¹⁵⁰ Hrytsak, "The postcolonial."

¹⁵¹ Dzyuba, *Internationalism*.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 42.

¹⁵³ Vale, "Mediated Monuments."

Given the comparative lack of post-independence architecture that could embed Ukraine's new national identity in urban space, the former seats of Soviet state ideology have remained as venues for contemporary state-building, as in the seamless appropriation of the former SSR headquarters and the potential move of the President's Office to the Ukrainian House. Ukrainian authorities have not only adopted buildings, they have adopted narratives, particularly the Soviet-sponsored narrative of ancient Kyiv manifested in the 1982 celebration's founding of Kyiv statue ensemble. These 'mother of Russia'-linked projects can also be placed into a larger context of a new post-socialist historiography of states aiming to advocate their links to ancient civilizations and thereby ratify the legitimacy of current regimes. Two of the most visible such efforts outside of Ukraine are the recent claims of Georgia on the Greek Argonauts myth, and Macedonia's appropriation of Alexander the Great's legacy, both of which led to transformations of built environments in the respective countries¹⁵⁴.

Lastly, the 1982 celebration projects make apparent that decommunization measures did not only establish a new Ukrainian identity, but signified a new foreign policy direction toward integration with the European Union. European-oriented tactics were used to re-attribute Soviet concepts and artifacts such as "victory", transformed into "commemoration"; the borrowing of the Western European poppy flower symbol to de-Sovietize WWII memorials and relics; and the recasting of the Peoples' Friendship Arch as a place that "celebrate[s] diversity" or "friendship", with EU member states, instead of with Russia and Belarus.

Overall, decommunization in newly independent Ukraine is multifold in its forms and purposes. Decommunization promotes human rights and utilizes anticolonial tactics in order to promote nation-building and historical revisionism in independent Ukraine. Yet in the built environment, decommunization's tactic of supporting identity building and "liberation" of Ukraine from the foreign, colonial presence of Russia demonstrates a narrow, incomplete understanding of Ukraine's role in the

¹⁵⁴ For example, see Suzanne Harris-Brandts, "The role of architecture in the Republic of Georgia's European aspirations," *Nationalities Papers* 46, no. 6 (2018): 1118-1135; Suzanne Harris-Brandts, "Constructing the Capital City: the politics of urban development and image making in Eurasia's hybrid regimes," (PhD diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2020).

Soviet Union and of the ambiguous meaning of Soviet artifacts in today's Ukraine. The decommunization policy's attempt to distinguish "colonizer", i.e., Russia, from the "colonized", i.e., Ukraine, in the built environment risks pursuing only the most obvious "red flags" such as Mother Motherland while ignoring others such as the Peoples' Friendship Arch or Founders' Monument. While the current 'blunt' approach may be useful for eliminating excessively problematic heritage, such as sites related to mass repressions, the existing partial, blindered approach of decommunization is not yet, and may never be, a truly comprehensive guideline for dealing with memory and national identity in the built environment.

Conclusion

This study's analysis of the 1500th anniversary of Kyiv celebration in 1982 showcased this event's importance in defining the contemporary cityscape of Kyiv through architectural urbanism and monumental art. The celebration's ideological nature provides a window into the evolution and implementation of Soviet monumental propaganda and nationality policy. The study's analysis shows the ideological artifacts of the celebration forming four distinct groups, representing two traditional Soviet narratives, the Marxist-Leninist paradigm and the commemoration of WWII, and two 'Ukraine-centered' narratives, the "Mother of Russian cities" and the "Friendship of the Peoples". Notably, the architectural urbanism and art objects associated with each of the four groups lack a clear stylistic divide, neither all classical nor all modern, and are predominantly legacy-oriented, rather than looking into the future.

Is Ukraine a post-colonial nation? The findings of the study indicate that Ukraine may indeed be aligned with this perspective, but also that Ukraine did in fact occupy a special place in the Soviet 'project' of affirmative action. The decay of the affirmative action strategy in Soviet nationality policy represented by the two 'Ukraine-centered' narratives was embodied throughout the celebration period (1979-1982) in media publications, ceremonial events, and in the built environment. The symbolic depiction of unity between the Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples in the celebration heritage signifies a dimension of Soviet nationality policy, albeit a hegemonic one, focused on the "merger" of nations. Russia may have been the most powerful member within the "family" of Slavic nations and the larger Soviet Union, but Ukraine, particularly Kyiv, occupied a superior historical and sentimental place

in that “family” quite different from the wholly subaltern role of, say, Ireland in the pre-1921 United Kingdom.

This study’s analysis of the transformation of the celebration heritage in the built environment under decommunization showcases the comparatively favorable treatment of the Soviet-sponsored Ukrainian historical narrative, especially historical reconstructions, by contemporary authorities in Ukraine. Objects and structures of “the Great Patriotic War” have largely stayed intact due to the exception made for them in the decommunization law, even if their ceremonial use and visual decorations has been slightly modified. Only the Marxist-Leninist narrative and associated architectural artifacts have been a primary target of decommunization, in large part due to the Euromaidan public protests of 2013-2014 and subsequent military conflict with Russia.

The spatial dimension of decommunization appears inconsistent, with major toponymic and semiotic transformations occurring absent major revisions of built form. Why? There can be multiple interpretations. Perhaps the historical narrative of Kyiv constructed by the Soviet Union is not so uncomfortable in contemporary Ukraine; the city was provided an honored and unique position as the mother of Russia, and Ukraine was a singular, if smaller and weaker, partner in a Soviet ‘special relationship’. And Ukraine’s suffering and heroism in the GPW were significant, making commemoration still meaningful today, even if Ukraine also suffered under Soviet occupation. The fact that Soviet-constructed symbols commemorating these narratives survive almost intact, despite a legal campaign to ‘decommunize’, indicates that the historiography of Ukraine may remain an incomplete project. Only Communism itself seems to be completely obsolete: the ubiquitous removal of figures of Lenin and of state symbols of the USSR and the Communist Party indicate that this aspect of Ukrainian history, at least, is unacceptable today. Ultimately, examining the historical architectural and monumental legacy of both the 1982 celebration and of the decommunization campaign provides an important avenue for understandings of decommunization as both an antithesis to the policies of the late Soviet state and, in some respects, as an evolution of those policies.

Table 1. Construction of public and sports facilities.

Name	Client	Contractor	Deadline year/quarter
Branch of the Central Museum of V.I. Lenin, 2 Khreshchatyk St. (now – Ukrainian House – Y.V.)	Kyiv City Executive Council	“Pivdenzakhidtransbud” trust	1981 - IV
Central Scientific Library of the Academy of Sciences of Ukr. SSR, 40-years of Zhovtnya avenue (now – V.I. Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine)	Academy of Sciences of Ukr. SSR	Holovkyivmiskbud	1982 - April
Museum of Folk Architecture and Everyday Life of Ukr. SSR /2-nd phase/	Ukrainian Society for Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments	Ukrainian Society for Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments	- " -
Cultural and educational complex “Knowledge” /1st phase/ 57/3 Chervonoarmiiska St.	“Knowledge” society of Ukrainian SSR	Holovkyivmiskbud	1980 - III
State Republican Library of the Communist Party of Ukraine /book storage/, 13 Borychiv descent	Ministry of Culture of Ukr. SSR	- " -	1980 - IV
T.G. Shevchenko Kyiv State Academic Theatre of Opera and Ballet /partial reconstruction/	- " -	- " -	1982 – start of works
Republican House of Organ and Chamber Music inside the cathedral, 75 Chervonoarmiiska St.	- " -	Kyiv City Executive Council Ministry of Housing and Communal Service Ministry of Culture	1981 - II
Administrative House of Kyiv City Executive Council, regional committee of the party and central committee of youth organisation of the Communist party of Ukraine	Kyiv city committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine	Holovkyivmiskbud	1981 - III
Hospital of invalides of the Great Patriotic War in Pushcha-Vodytsia	Kyiv City Executive Council	Holovkyivmiskbud	1982 - April
The House of Trade Unions on the square of Zhovtneva revolution (now – Maidan Nezhaloznosti, Y.V.) /1 phase /	Ukrprofrada (trade unions council)	- " -	1979 - IV
Skating rink DST “Zenith”, 88 Melnykova St.	- " -	- " -	1981 - IV
stadiums:			
Republican stadium (now – Olimpiisky, Y.V.), 55 Chervonoarmiiska St.	Committee of sports of Ukr. SSR	- " -	1980 - II
“Dynamo”, 3 Kirova St.	Ministry of Interior of Ukr. SSR	Ministry of Interior of Ukr. SSR	- " -
"Spartak", 103 Frunze St.	Ukrainian republican council of “Spartak” voluntary sports society	Ukrprofrada (trade unions council)	- " -
"Pioneer", 22 Akademika Tupoleva St.	Kyiv City Executive Council	Holovkyivmiskbud	- " -
Track and field area, 55 Chervonoarmiiska St.	Committee of sports of Ukr. SSR	- " -	1982 - April

The house of marriage and birth registration, 1 – 5 Brest-Litovskiyi avenue	Kyiv City Executive Council	- " -	1980 - IV
Exhibition pavillion at VDNH (exhibition of the achievements of public economy) of Ukr. SSR	- " -	- " -	1982 - April
The House of Trade on Lvivska square	Ministry of Commerce of Ukr. SSR	- " -	1980 - IV /launch/, 1981 - IV
Department store “Dytiachyi Svit”, Andrii Malyshka St. in Dniprovskiyi district	- " -	- " -	1982 - April
hotels:			
"Bratyslava", 7 Andrii Malyshka St.	Chief department for foreign tourism at the Council of Ministers of Ukr. SSR	Holovkyivmiskbud	1980 - April
"Krasnaya Zvezda”, 1 – 3 Parizka Communy St.	Kyiv City Executive Council	- " -	1981 - IV
"Tourist" on Livoberezhna square	Ukrprofrada (trade unions council)	- " -	1982 - April
Hotel of Derzhplan of Ukr. SSR on Slavy square	Administrative office of Derzhplan of Ukr. SSR	- " -	- " -

Table 2. Construction and reconstruction of trade, public services and healthcare facilities.

Name	Client	Contractor	Deadline year/quarter
to construct:			
The House of Furniture, 8 Druzhby Narodov St.	Ministry of Commerce of Ukr. SSR	Ministry of Industrial Construction of Ukr. SSR	1982 - April
trade complex, 4 Suvorova St.	- " -	Holovkyivmiskbud	1981 - IV
Department store on Pechersk square	- " -	- " -	- " -
The House of consumer services in Obolon residential area	Ministry of Consumer Services of Ukr. SSR	- " -	- " -
The House of consumer services, Panasa Myrnoho St.	- " -	- " -	1982 - April
recreational complex in Berezhnyi residential area	- " -	- " -	- " -
hospital, Cheska St.	Kyiv City Executive Council	- " -	- " -
Medical school, Bratyslavska St. /Dniprovskiy district/	- " -	- " -	1981 - IV
hospital, Vidpochynku St. /Leningradskiy district/	- " -	- " -	
hospital, 95/109 Mykhaila Kotelnikova St.	- " -	- " -	1982 - April
maternity hospital, 12 Romena Rollana St.	- " -	- " -	1980 - IV
maternity hospital N 1 /Pecherskiy district/	- " -	- " -	1982 - April
clinic, 59-83 40-years Zhovtnya	- " -	- " -	1981 - IV
clinic in Teremky residential area	Kyiv City Executive Council	Holovkyivmiskbud	1981 - III
to reconstruct:			
obstetric and gynecological hospital building N 22, 17 T. Shevchenko boulevard	Kyiv City Executive Council	Holovkyivmiskbud	1982 - I
ambulance station, 37 Lenina St.	- " -	- " -	1980 - II
hospital building N 7, 12 Laboratornyi provulok	- " -	office "Kyivrembud"	1980 - III
hospital building N 24; 20 Striletska St.	- " -	- " -	
skin diseases early treatment center N 2, 72 Saksahanskoho St.	- " -	- " -	1980 - IV
hospital N 9, 1 Chervonoarmiiska St.	- " -	- " -	1982 - I

Table 3. Construction, reconstruction and launch of trolleybus and tram lines, metro line, maintaining of parks and public squares.

Name	Client	Contractor	Deadline year/quarter
Construction of trolleybus line through Korotchenko St. / from Bednoho St. to "Mayak" factory	Kyiv City Executive Council	Kyiv City Executive Council	1982 - I
Reconstruction of tramway line through Kartvelishvili St. and Romena Rollana St.	- " -	- " -	1980 - IV
Construction of "Grushky" park in Zhovtnevyi district /1 phase/	- " -	- " -	1979 - IV
Landscaping works in "Druzhba Narodiv" park /central alley/ in Minskyi district	- " -	- " -	1980 - IV
Construction of park in Shevchenkivskiyi district /1 phase/	- " -	- " -	1979 - IV
Foundation of landscape park devoted to 1500 years of Kyiv foundation	- " -	- " -	1981-II
Metro line / from Red square to Korniiichuk avenue /	V.I. Lenin Kyiv Metro	Kyivmetrobud	1980 - IV
reconstruction (maintenance?) of squares:			
Zhovtneva revolution square (now – Maidan Nezalezzhnosti, Y.V.)	Kyiv City Executive Council	Kyiv City Executive Council	1982 - I
Moskovska square	Academy of Sciences of Ukr. SSR, Kyiv City Executive Council	- " -	- " -
Lvivska square	Ministry of Commerce of Ukr. SSR	- " -	1981 - IV
Minska square	Kyiv City Executive Council	Kyiv City Executive Council	1981 - IV
Lesi Ukrainki square	- " -	- " -	- " -
Livoberezhna square	Ukrprofrada (trade unions council)	- " -	1982 - I
"Komsomolska" metro station	Kyiv City Executive Council	- " -	- " -
Poshtova square	Kyiv City Executive Council Ukrainian Society for Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments	Kyiv City Executive Council Ukrainian Society for Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments	1981 - IV
Chervona square	Kyiv City Executive Council	Kyiv City Executive Council	1982 - I
Kontraktova square	- " -	- " -	- " -

Table 4. Designing and erection of monuments.

Name	Client		Contractor	Deadline year/quarter
Monument to reunification of Ukraine and Russia	Kyiv City Executive Council	Holovkyivmiskbud Kyivzelenbud Kyivmiskshlyakhbud Arts fund of Derzhbud of Ukr. SSR	видана	1981 - IV
Monument to reunification of Ukrainian people in the unitary Soviet Ukrainian state	- " -	- " -	1980 - III	1982 - April
Monument to founders of Kyiv	- " -	- " -	- " -	- " -
Obelisk to city-hero Kyiv (WW II commemoration, Y.V.)	- " -	Holovkyivmiskbud "Mostobud N 1" trust Kyivzelenbud Kyivmiskshlyakhbud Arts fund of Derzhbud of Ukr. SSR	1980 - II	- " -
Monument to komsomol heroes and youth	- " -	Holovkyivmiskbud Kyivzelenbud Kyivmiskshlyakhbud Arts fund of Derzhbud of Ukr. SSR	1980 - III	1982 - April
Monument to P.H. Tychyna	- " -	- " -	1980 - II	1981 - II
Bust monument to M.V. Gogol	Kyiv City Executive Council	Holovkyivmiskbud Kyivzelenbud Kyivmiskshlyakhbud Arts fund of Derzhbud of Ukr. SSR	1980 - II	1981 - II
Monument to S.A. Kovpak	- " -	- " -	- " -	1981 - I
Monument to O.E. Korniiichuk	- " -	- " -	1981 - II	1982 - April
Open air model of Kyiv in X-XI centuries	- " -	- " -	1980 - IV	- " -
Monument to V.I. Vernadskyi	Academy of Sciences	Akadembud Arts fund of Derzhbud of Ukr. SSR	видана	1980 - III

Table 5. Restoration of historical and cultural heritage sites.

Name	Client	Contractor	Deadline year/quarter
St. Sophia cathedral, 24 Volodymyrska St.	Derzhbud of Ukr. SSR	Derzhbud of Ukr. SSR	1979-IV
Spas on Berestovi church, 15 Sichnevoho Povstannya St.	Kyiv City Executive Council	- " -	1982 - April
Cathedral on 75 Chervonoarmiiska St. / restoration in order to open the House of Organ and Chamber music /	Ministry of Culture of Ukr. SSR	- " -	1980 - II
Bell tower of Uspenskyi cathedral on 21 Sichnevoho Povstannya	Kyiv City Executive Council	- " -	1980 - III
“Samson” fountain on Chervona square		- " -	1981 - IV
Kyrylivska church on 103 Frunze St. /maintenance/	Derzhbud of Ukr. SSR	Kyiv City Executive Council	1980 - II
Pokrovska church on 7 Zelinskoho St. /renovation/	Ukrainian Society for Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments	Ukrainian Society for Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments	1982 - April
Post station on Poshtova square /renovation/	- " -	- " -	1980 - II
Golden Gate on 35 Volodymyrska St.	Kyiv City Executive Council	Derzhbud of Ukr. SSR Kyiv City Executive Council	1982 - I

Table 6. The number of workers and engineers or other technical professionals delegated by regional executive councils (oblvkoncoms) for participation in construction works in Kyiv city.

Name	Regional executive committee	1980		1981		1982	
		workers	engineers and other technical staff	workers	engineers and other technical staff	workers	engineers and other technical staff
overall		1065	35	1035	36	505	21
Branch of V.I. Lenin Central Museum	Dnipropetrovskiyi	100	3	80	3	30	1
	Sevastopol executive city council	10	1	10	1	-	-
Ukrainian state museum of the 1941 - 1945 Great Patriotic War history	Donetskiyi	120	4	100	3	50	2
	Kharkivskiyi	50	2	50	2	40	1
Central scientific library of the Academy of Sciences of Ukr. SSR	Voroshylivgradskiyi	100	3	90	3	50	2
	Kirovogradskiyi	40	1	40	1	-	-
Administrative House of Kyiv City Executive Council, regional committee of the party and central committee of youth organisation of the Communist party of Ukraine	Kyivskiyi	20	1	20	1	20	1
T.G. Shevchenko Kyiv State Academic Theatre of Opera and Ballet	Zaporizkiyi	-	-	60	2	60	2
Exhibition pavillion at VDNH (exhibition of the achievements of public economy) of Ukr. SSR	Rovenskiyi	30	1	30	1	30	1
The house of marriage and birth registration	Volynskiyi	30	1	30	1	-	-
	Zhytomyrskiyi	50	2	30	1	10	1
Republican House of Organ and Chamber Music	Lvivskiyi	60	2	30	1	-	-
Hotel on Slavy square	Vinnytskiyi	40	1	40	1	-	-
“Tourist” hotel	Khmel'nitskiyi	35	1	55	2	25	1
“Krasnaya Zvezda” hotel	Chernihivskiyi	50	2	20	1	10	1
Department store on Pecherska square	Khersonskiyi	40	1	30	1	20	1
Trade complex, 4 Suvorova St.	Krymskiyi	30	1	30	1	-	-
Department store “Dytiachyi Svit”	Cherkasskiyi	40	1	40	1	20	1
Hospital for involides of the Great Patriotic war	Odesskiyi	60	2	50	2	20	1
	Poltavskiyi	40	1	40	1	-	-
Hospital, Cheska St.	Sumskiyi	40	1	30	1	30	1

Monument to reunification of Ukraine and Russia	Zakarpatskyi	20	1	20	1	10	1
	Ternopilskyi	30	1	30	1	30	1
Monument to reunification of Ukrainian people in the unitary Ukrainian Soviet state	Ivano-Frankivskyi	30	1	20	1	10	1
	Chernivetskyi	-	-	60	2	40	1

Table 7. List of [new] public dining facilities whose design, reconstruction and renovation is performed by regional executive councils (oblyvkoncoms).

Name	Contractors / regional executive committee	Deadline year/quarter
Cafe, 12 Akademika Zabolotnoho St.	Vinnytskyi	1981 - IV
Cafe, 4 Minske highway	Volynskyi	- " -
Restaurant, 89/91 40-years Zhovtnya avenue	Voroshyl'ovhradskyi	- " -
Cafe, 28 Khreshchatyk St.	Dnipropetrovskyi	- " -
Cafe, 2 T. Shevchenko boulevard	Donetskyi	- " -
Cafe, 37 Saratovska St.	Zhytomyrskyi	1981 - II
Restaurant, 223 Brest-Lyтовskyi boulevard	Zakarpatskyi	
Cafe, 27-a Zhdanova St.	Zaporizkyi	1981 - IV
Cafe, 8 Komsomolska St.	Ivano-frankivskyi	1981 - III
Cafe, 13/14 D. Korotchenka St.	Kyivskyi	- " -
Cafe, 6 Khreshchatyk St.	Kirovohradskyi	- " -
Cafe, 5 Marshala Malynovskoho	Krymskyi	1981 - IV
Cafe, 3 Engelsa St.	Lvivskyi	- " -
Cafe, 15 Mateyuka St.	Mykolaivskyi	1981 - III
Cafe, 114 Chervonoarmiiska St.	Odeskyi	- " -
Cafe, 19/18 Myra St.	Poltavskyi	- " -
Cafe, 25 Avtozavodska St.	Rovenskyi	- " -
Cafe, 40-richhya Zhovtnya avenue, 94/96	Sumskyi	- " -
Cafe, 16 Akademika Tupoleva St.	Ternopil'skyi	1981 - III
Cafe, 1 Basseina St.	Kharkivskyi	1981 - IV
Cafe, 7/2 Kartvelishvili St.	Khersonskyi	1981 - III
Cafe, 1 Mechnykova St.	Khmeln'tskyi	- " -
Cafe, 85/87 Chervonoarmiiska St.	Cherkaskyi	- " -
Cafe, 83 Lepse St.	Chernivetskyi	1981 - IV
Cafe, Vynogradar microdistrict	Chernihivskyi	- " -
Beer restaurant, Pershotravnevyyi park	Ministry of Commerce of Ukr. SSR Kyiv Executive City Council	1982 - I
Cafe, Volodymyrska Girka /basement of the former Mykhailivskyi cathedral/	- " -	- " -

All tables: Facilities constructed for 1982 celebration. Data from “The scope of public works outlined in Decree #597 of the Council of Ministers of Ukrainian SSR, On the construction, reconstruction of social and cultural facilities and the restoration of historical and cultural monuments in connection with the preparations for the celebration of the 1500th anniversary of the founding of the city of Kyiv”, dated December 28, 1979.




Figure 1. Key initiators of the 1500th anniversary of Kyiv celebration.

Left – Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1964-1982), Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (1977-1982); Volodymyr Shcherbytskyi, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine (1972-1989), Chairman of the Council of Ministers Ukrainian SSR (1965-1972); Oleksandr Lyashko, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Ukrainian SSR (1972-1987), Head of the organizing committee of the 1500-th anniversary of Kyiv (1979-1982);

Center and upper right – Boris Paton, Head of the Academy of Sciences of Ukrainian SSR / Ukraine (1962-2020); Petro Tron'ko, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers (1961-1978), Vice Head of the Academy of Sciences of Ukrainian SSR (1978-1979); Petro Tolochko, Head of the Department of Kyiv Archeology, Academy of Sciences of Ukrainian SSR (1972-1982); Boris Rybakov, Director of the Institute of Material Culture (Archeology), Academy of Sciences of USSR (1956-1987).

Bottom right – Valentyn Zgurskyi, Head of the Executive Committee of Kyiv City Council (1979-1990).

Figure by authors.

Image sources: Wikimedia commons




Figure 2. Types of projects included into 1979 Decree #597 of the Council of Ministers on Kyiv-1500 anniversary celebration.
Figure by authors.




Figure 3. The four groups of Soviet ideological narratives in the Kyiv 1500 legacy, and affiliated urban development projects.
Figure by authors.





Figure 4. Kyiv Founders monument. Left: Kyiv Founders Monument on the interim Ukrainian national currency, 1992; UINP website main page screenshot “Decommunization and Rehabilitation” (left button) and “Memorialization” (right button). Right: Kyiv Founders monument after reconstruction, 2010s.

Image sources: Wikimedia commons, <https://uinp.gov.ua>.



Figure 5. Peoples' Friendship Arch. Left: the European Village leaflet, 2012. Right: "Arch of Diversity" performance, 2017 and "Crack in the Friendship" performance, 2018. Image sources: eeas.europa.eu, apostrophe.ua, Wikimedia commons.




Figure 6. Mother Motherland monument. Left – aerial view of the monument in 1980s. Right (top-down): monument decorated with poppy wreath for annual commemoration event in May; Motherland on the background of a flag pole carrying the national flag of Ukraine. Image sources: Killeso (1985); warmuseum.kiev.ua; authors.




Figure 7. Lenin Museum in 1980s. Center and bottom right: fragments from the poster of the winning entry of Terra Dignitas design competition, presenting the envisioned evolution of the building’s programming, 2015. Top right: rendering of the proposed new President’s Office in the Ukrainian House, 2019.

Image sources: Killesso (1985); terrাদignitas.kga.gov.ua; [33BY Architecture](#).